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ABSTRACT 
 
The Forgotten Footnote of the Second World War: An Examination of the Historiography of 
Scandinavia during World War II 
 
by 
 
Jason Phillips 
 
The Anglo-American interpretation of the Second World War has continuously overlooked the 
significance of the Scandinavian region to the outcome of the war.  This thesis seeks to address 
some of the more glaring errors of omission that have dampened the Anglo-American 
understanding of the war.  Attention will first be paid to Finland and how its war against the 
Soviet Union in 1939-1940, known as the Winter War, influenced Adolf Hitler and his decision 
to launch Operation ‘Barbarossa.’  In regards to Sweden, attention will be paid to how critical 
Swedish iron ore was to the Nazi war economy.  Finally, the thesis will examine how the Anglo-
American interpretation of the German invasion of Norway is flawed.  The thesis seeks to 
change the way that the role Scandinavia played during the Second World War is understood 
amongst Anglo-American historians and begin a new conversation on the story of World War II. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
More books have been written about the Second World War than could ever be read in a 
lifetime, with hundreds of new volumes added every year.  Everything from military to economic 
histories of the war, biographies of participants from Adolf Hitler to Field Marshal Montgomery, 
general surveys to critical examinations of battles, armies, or the means of production of various 
belligerents have garnered their own books and articles.  Yet, for all that has been written about 
the Second World War, one key area of the war has continued to be under covered amongst 
Anglo-American historians: Scandinavia.  The general interpretation of how the war affected this 
geographic area is brief and vague, only rarely do English-speaking historians delve into this 
region in their works on the Second World War.  This thesis seeks to address this critical 
oversight and show why Scandinavia was more important to the outcome of the Second World 
War than Anglo-American historians have generally acknowledged it to have been.   
 In order to illustrate the general interpretation of the role Scandinavia played during 
World War II, five general surveys of the War will be analyzed to understand how Finland, 
Sweden, and Norway have fit into the Anglo-American story of the War.
1
  Winston Churchill’s 
six volume history, The Second World War, represents the first interpretation of the Second 
World War, and its importance as a major work of World War II continues to this day.  B.H. 
Liddell Hart’s History of the Second World War, published in 1970, was a major work of the 
second wave of World War II scholarship, and like Churchill’s work it is still held in high regard 
amongst historians.  Military historian John Keegan became a prominent historian with the 
publication of his groundbreaking work, The Face of Battle; however, it is his 1989 work The 
                                                          
1
 For the purpose of this study Scandinavia will be defined as Norway, Sweden, and Finland; rather than the 
traditional definition of Norway, Sweden, and Denmark. 
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Second World War which is of interest to this thesis.  In order to get a modern perspective, two 
books from 2011, Max Hastings’s Inferno: The World At War, 1939-1945 and Andrew Roberts’s 
The Storm of War: A New History of the Second World War will be analyzed.  These works were 
chosen because they have either had a long publishing history and history of academic use or 
they have been recent revisions by prominent military historians, making them a genuine 
example of the Anglo-American historiographic tradition.  These authors’ views of Finland, 
Sweden, and Norway will be discussed in detail. 
War for Finland did not begin in September 1939; rather, it had essentially been going on 
since 1938 when the Soviet Union began discussions with the Finns for bases in the Gulf of 
Finland that could be used to protect the Soviet city of Leningrad.  The Finns refused to 
capitulate to the Soviet demands, even after the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact which 
made allies of Germany and the Soviet Union and ended Finnish hopes for an alliance with 
Adolf Hitler for the maintenance of Finnish sovereignty.  War would breakout between Finland 
and the Soviet Union on the last day of November 1939 and last until March 1940.  After the 
defeat of Finland, the Finnish government began to drift as close to Germany as they could and 
joined in Operation ‘Barbarossa,’ or in Finland what was called the Continuation War against the 
Soviet Union.  The wars themselves will be covered in more detail in the first chapter of this 
thesis.  The Finns were also a main supplier of raw materials to Hitler’s Reich, especially Finnish 
nickel.   
It would be unfair to criticize Churchill for not giving events in Scandinavia during the 
winter of 1939-1940 enough coverage, for he spends a great deal of time in analyzing these 
events, specifically the Winter War and how it could be used to the benefit of the British war 
strategy.  However, this is all that Churchill actually discusses in any detail.  There is no mention 
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of the nickel trade or how it had influenced German-Soviet relations, nor is there any serious 
discussion of how the Germans viewed the Winter War.  Churchill noted, “There is no doubt that 
Hitler and all his generals meditated profoundly upon the Finnish exposure, and that it played a 
potent part in influencing the Fuehrer’s thought.”2  This was certainly true, but Churchill’s 
account lacked any discussion of the larger issue of Finnish-Soviet relations and how this 
affected Hitler’s thinking. 
Liddell Hart had been a British Captain during the First World War and later became a 
highly influential writer of military theory and history in Great Britain.  Liddell Hart’s 
interpretation of the Winter War was much better than Churchill’s, although he draws the same 
conclusion.  The reason that Liddell Hart’s interpretation is better is that he covered the war in a 
small chapter, keeping everything together and providing a more detailed analysis of the conflict; 
whereas, Churchill had parts about the Winter War scattered throughout his six volume set.  
Liddell Hart argued that the British saw in Finland an opportunity to capture the Swedish iron 
ore and that the war showed the world the deficiencies of the Red Army, something that would 
influence Hitler’s decision to launch Operation Barbarossa.3  The problem with Liddell Hart’s 
work, though, is that he did not discuss the impact that the Winter War had on German thinking 
in more than just one sentence.  Liddell Hart simply stated his claims and sweept through the 
Winter War in a matter of pages, leaving little covered of actual importance. 
Military historian John Keegan has been regarded as a genius on military theory.  His 
1989 book, The Second World War, has generally been regarded as an authority of World War II.  
There is one problem with Keegan’s book, though; he only devoted three paragraphs to the 
Winter War.  Keegan did point out that the Winter War allowed the Germans to understand that 
                                                          
2
 Winston Churchill, The Gathering Storm (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1948), 543. 
3
 B.H. Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War (Old Saybrook, Connecticut: Konecky & Konecky, 
1970), 44-45. 
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the Allies had plans on occupying Scandinavia and cutting off the iron-ore shipments the 
Germans needed, but he did this in a few sentences and moves on.
4
  Keegan did not give much 
analysis on why the Winter War mattered to World War II or how it influenced Hitler’s decision 
to invade the Soviet Union.  Instead, Keegan simply described the War in a few paragraphs in 
military terms and moved on; in this, he seriously understated the impact that this limited conflict 
would have upon the later direction of the war. 
Max Hastings did a much better job of describing the conflict in detail than the other 
authors mentioned before,  as he devoted more pages and more time in discussing the conflict, 
how the Winter War was waged, and the key campaigns and battles of the Winter War.  
Hastings’s interpretation is not a fully accurate interpretation of the Winter War and its 
significance, though.  For instance, Hastings argued, “The Finnish campaign was irrelevant to 
the confrontation between Germany and the Allies, but it importantly influenced the strategy of 
both.  They alike concluded that the Soviet Union was a paper tiger; that Stalin’s armies were 
weak, his commanders bunglers.”5  Certainly this is an important point and an accurate 
conclusion of the significance of the Winter War, but it does not tell the full story.  Hastings did 
not expand much upon this one single point, leaving a lot of the importance of the Winter War 
out of his book. 
Andrew Roberts’s interpretation, though succinct, contained a great military analysis of 
the Winter War but offered little more.  For instance, Roberts noted that Hitler had learned the 
lesson from the Winter War that the Soviet Union was weak and could be conquered.
6
  Yet 
nowhere in Roberts’s interpretation of the Second World War is found any mention of Finnish 
                                                          
4
 John Keegan, The Second World War (New York: Penguin Books, 1990), 49. 
5
 Max Hastings, Inferno: The World at War, 1939-1945 (New York: Alfred K. Knopf, 2011), 38-39. 
6
 Andrew Roberts, The Storm of War: A New History of the Second World War (New York: Harper Collins 
Publishers, 2011), 29-34. 
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nickel or the impact of Finnish-Soviet relations on Nazi thinking.  So while Roberts might have 
written a New History of the Second World War, some of the interpretations remain from the old 
interpretations of Churchill, Liddell Hart, and Keegan.  One thing that is astounding about 
Roberts’s work, and Hastings’s work as well, is that they could continue to point to the Winter 
War as influencing Hitler’s decision to invade the Soviet Union yet never analyze if there was 
more to the story of Finland or how this small state influenced Hitler.  The first chapter of this 
work will show that there is more to the story than these historians have noted. 
 Unlike Finland, Sweden was never invaded nor did Sweden ever take up arms against 
either the Allied or the Axis Powers.  How, then, could this nation have made a major impact 
upon how the Second World War played our?  The answer is simple, Sweden possessed the 
finest iron ore on the planet and Germany was a major trading partner of the Swedes.  Indeed, 
Swedish iron ore would drive Allied plans during the Winter War and play a determining role in 
Hitler’s decision to invade Norway in April 1940.  Swedish iron ore was absolutely critical to the 
German war economy, for without it the Germans could not have fought the Second World War.  
Amazingly, though, this is something that is also severely under covered amongst Anglo-
American historians.  The Swedish participation in rescuing Holocaust victims has also been 
largely ignored by English-speaking historians, even though it is the greatest evidence of the 
importance of Swedish iron ore to the German war economy.  The Germans were so concerned 
over losing the iron ore that they overlooked the Swedes rescuing Jews; no other country 
received this free pass from Hitler and the Nazis. 
 As he did with the Winter War, Churchill spent a lot of time covering the importance of 
Swedish iron ore to British strategy, specifically how the British could withhold it from 
Germany.  Indeed, compared to the later works, Churchill’s account is by far the most thorough.  
9 
 
Yet, Churchill never goes back to the importance of Swedish iron ore after the occupation of 
Norway.  For Churchill, once it could no longer be taken away from the Germans, it lost all 
importance.  Liddell Hart briefly introduced the concept of Swedish iron ore into his discussion 
of early Allied plans to use the Winter War in order to prevent Germany from attaining any more 
iron ore from Sweden but never went into any detail of why this would have helped the British 
win the war or the impact that this would have on the Second World War.  Keegan only 
mentioned Swedish iron ore in his discussion of Allied intentions for Scandinavia and cutting 
Germany off of this vital resource.  Hastings mentioned Swedish iron ore twice in his latest work 
and Roberts only brings it up three times; both historians brought the issue up only when talking 
about Allied strategy to cut the iron ore off.  The story of the importance of Swedish iron ore for 
later German actions, especially in Russia, then, has continued to lose out in the newer Anglo-
American works on the Second World War, with fewer and fewer pages devoted to this topic.  
None of these works mentions any of the actions by the Swedish government or its citizenry to 
rescue the Jews during the Holocaust, it is just not important to the general story that Anglo-
American historians have construed. 
 As stated earlier, the Winter War between Finland and the Soviet Union brought 
Scandinavia into the spotlight, with the Allies looking for ways to cut off the German supply of 
Swedish iron ore.  The major view of how to do that was to occupy the Norwegian port of 
Narvik, which was from where the Swedish iron ore was shipped during the winter months when 
Swedish ports were too frozen to receive ships.  This strategy, combined with the Altmark 
Incident, which was a naval engagement between British and German ships in Norwegian 
waters, would lead to the German invasion of Norway in April 1940.  The Anglo-American 
interpretation of the invasion, though, often seems based more on myth than fact, for the Anglo-
10 
 
American interpretation places the blame on the actions of Vidkun Quisling.  Quisling was a far-
right politician in Norway before the war who wanted to institute a coup with Nazi support.  
Because of his visits with Hitler, though, he has become the scapegoat for the German decision 
to invade Norway, an interpretation that conveniently overlooks British sins of omission. 
 Churchill’s interpretation of the reason the invasion was launched had little to do with the 
Altmark Incident, although Churchill did concede that the event “no doubt gave a spur to 
action.”7  Churchill placed the blame upon Quisling and refused to budge from this, inserting a 
massive quote from the Nuremburg trials in which German General Falkenhorst described how 
he was selected to lead the German invasion of Norway.  Essentially, Falkenhorst stated that the 
Germans drew plans up for an invasion because of fears that the British were about to take 
preventative measures in Norway.
8
  The implication behind this is that the Germans were already 
planning the occupation of this country, and the Altmark Incident was just a minor event that led 
to Hitler launching the invasion a little early.  Churchill made it a point, as the third chapter of 
this thesis will show, to argue that the German decision was made upon Quisling’s December 
visit to Germany in which Quisling stressed that the British were going to take action in Norway 
to Hitler.   
 Liddell Hart’s interpretation of why the Germans chose to invade Norway is much more 
reliable and does not make the same mistakes that Churchill’s interpretation made.  For instance, 
Liddell Hart correctly pointed out that Hitler’s reaction to the Quisling visit was that it was in 
Germany’s interest for Norway to remain a neutral country, not that Quisling’s visit had 
convinced Hitler of the need to invade Norway and institute a puppet government.  Liddell Hart 
argued, “According to the German admirals, the Altmark affair was decisive in swinging Hitler 
                                                          
7
 Churchill, The Gathering Storm, 564. 
8
 Churchill, 564. 
11 
 
in favour of intervention in Norway.  It was the spark that set fire to the powder trail.”9  Keegan 
would continue in his work the correct interpretation of events that Liddell Hart had argued.  
Keegan noted that the Quisling visit had not resulted in a concrete German decision to invade 
Norway, but rather it was the Altmark Incident that pushed Hitler to the decision that Norway 
should be occupied before it was too late.
10
   
 Ironically, despite the more accurate interpretations of Liddell Hart and Keegan, both 
Hastings’s and Roberts’s later accounts of the German decision to invade Norway are both 
overly vague in their interpretation.  Hastings mentioned the Altmark Incident but did not put any 
significance onto it other than noting, “For months, Hitler had been fearful of British intervention 
in Norway,…[Hitler’s] agitation acquired urgency on 14 February 1940, when Royal Navy 
destroyers pursued…[the] Altmark into a Norwegian fjord to free 299 captive British merchant 
seamen.  Determined to preempt a British initiative…he gave the final order for the invasion 
fleet to sail.”11  Curiously absent from Hastings work is any reference to the meetings between 
Hitler and Quisling.  Rather than continuing the flawed interpretation of Churchill, then, 
Hastings can be criticized for refusing to even tackle the question of why Germany invaded 
Norway.  Roberts, on the other hand, fell into the Churchill trap by arguing, “An incident on 16 
February, in which the neutral Norwegians seemed to have taken the Royal Navy’s side when 
HMS Cossack daringly rescued 299 British prisoners from a German vessel, the Altmark, also 
persuaded the Führer of Norway’s iniquity.”12  Roberts did not place any of the blame on 
Quisling per se; rather, Roberts notes that Admiral Erich Raeder had recommended establishing 
                                                          
9
 Liddell Hart,  History of the Second World War, 55-56. 
10
 Keegan, The Second World War, 49-50. 
11
 Hastings, Inferno, 42. 
12
 Roberts, The Storm of War, 38. 
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bases in Norway, which was something Raeder and Quisling had discussed.
13
  Essentially, then, 
Roberts was arguing that it was not the Altmark Incident that urged Hitler to action, the decision 
goes back to Hitler’s conversations with Raeder and Qusiling.  As Chapter Three will show, the 
decision to invade Norway was based solely upon the Altmark Incident, as everything 
beforehand had been hypothetical planning. 
 What should be stressed about these various works and how they interpret Scandinavia 
during World War II is the fact that none of the Anglo-American authors, with the exception of 
Churchill, actually devote much space to the analysis of these countries.  Churchill, of course, 
wrote six-volumes on the war, so he had more of an opportunity to discuss this area than the 
other authors.  At the same time, it must be stressed how important it is that the only one of these 
authors who spent a large amount of time covering Scandinavia during World War II, Churchill, 
is ultimately flawed in his interpretation.  This thesis will show that under covering Scandinavia 
during the Second World War has been a mistake for several important reasons.  The first 
chapter will argue that Finland was extremely important to how the Germans viewed the Soviet 
Union.  The Winter War showed the Germans the weaknesses of the Soviet Union and Finnish 
nickel helped push the Germans into launching Operation ‘Barbarossa.’  The second chapter will 
examine how vital Swedish iron ore was to the German war economy and look into Swedish 
actions during the Holocaust, particularly the rescue of the Danish Jews.  The importance of 
Swedish iron ore is illustrated by the fact that the Germans were willing to overlook the Swedes 
saving Jews during the war because of the fact that they could not risk the Swedes blowing up 
their mines and losing all of the iron ore that Sweden was providing them.  The third chapter will 
examine how the British can be blamed for both the invasion or Norway and the victory of the 
Germans in Norway.  This chapter will primarily focus upon why the Germans invaded Norway 
                                                          
13
 Roberts, 38. 
13 
 
and how the British squandered victory in Norway.  These arguments will show why 
Scandinavia is worthy of more than the mere footnote status that Anglo-American historians of 
the Second World War have typically attached to it. 
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CHAPTER 2 
FINLAND: THE NATION THAT ALTERED THE COURSE OF THE WAR 
Our navy was engaged against the Finnish fleet…I remember hearing when I was at 
Stalin’s in Moscow that one of our submarines had been unable to sink a Swedish 
merchant vessel which it had mistaken for a Finnish ship.  The Germans observed this 
incident and gave us a teasing pinch by offering their assistance: “Are things that bad?  
You can’t even sink an unarmed ship?  Maybe you need some help from us?”  You can 
imagine how painful this was to us.  Hitler was letting us know that he recognized our 
helplessness and was gloating over it.—Nikita Khrushchev14 
 Many historians have either forgotten the importance of the Soviet-Finnish Winter War 
or have chosen to overlook its importance, but the pungent comment from Khrushchev’s 
memoirs serves as a reminder of the significance contemporaries assigned the conflict.  This 
passage, so illustrative of German attitude towards the weakness they saw in the Red Army, is 
also indicative  of the impact that Finland had on Hitler’s decision for war with the Soviet Union, 
and thus on the outcome of the Second World War.  From the Winter War to the Continuation 
War Finland never won any major battles nor did they even participate in any major battles; 
however, Finland’s impact on the war should not be just a footnote in the annals of World War 
II.  In summary of the Winter War, Khrushchev wrote, “[The Winter War] also exposed our 
weaknesses to Hitler.  It doesn’t take much imagination to guess what Hitler must have 
concluded…‘The Soviet Union has barely managed to handle a country that we could have 
disposed of in a few hours.  What would be left of the Russians if we attacked them with our best 
equipment and masses of our best-trained, best-organized troops?”15 
One of the most influential books written about Adolf Hitler’s decision to invade the 
Soviet Union was Gabriel Gorodetsky’s Grand Delusion.  The book has become a modern 
classic and a highly influential work for any serious scholar of the Second World War.  The main 
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 Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, trans. and ed. Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1970), 153. 
15
 Ibid., 156. 
15 
 
idea of Grand Delusion was that the German decision for the invasion of Russia was rooted not 
solely in Nazi ideology but rather stemmed from the realities of the geopolitical scene at the 
time.  Gorodetsky argued,  
Hitler’s decision to attack Russia is indeed enigmatic.  It is hardly possible to detect a 
direct line leading from his pledge in Mein Kampf to ‘terminate the endless German drive 
to the south and west of Europe, and direct our gaze towards the lands in the east; to the 
actual decision to embark on Operation ‘Barbarossa’.  The commonly held view bypasses 
the difficulty by claiming that Hitler had consistently aimed at the destruction of Moscow 
‘as the headquarters of the “Judaeo-Bolshevist world conspiracy”’.   The fact that the 
crusade against Bolshevism and the extermination of the Jews revolutionized the course 
of the war in 1941 is not sufficient in itself to prove steadfast adherence to a blueprint.  
The ideological convictions found open expression only once the decision on 
‘Barbarossa’ had been taken, and to a large extent diverted Hitler from a more rational 
strategic policy which had characterized his military leadership so far.
16
 
Although plausible, Gorodetsky’s analysis slighted one major geopolitical impediment to good 
German-Soviet relations, Finland.  While he went into great detail in describing how the Balkans 
influenced Hitler’s decision to invade the Soviet Union, Gorodetsky completely left Finland out 
of the discussion.  From Gorodetsky’s work one would get the impression that not only was 
Finland not a major factor, but the country was not even a minor factor, in the events leading up 
to ‘Operation Barbarossa.’  This failure to recognize the importance of Finland in both German 
and Soviet calculations has consistently been a major trend in the historiography of ‘Operation 
Barbarossa’ in particular and the Second World War in general.17   
Historians and scholars have continued to overlook the influence that Finland had on 
World War II.  From the Winter War of 1939 between Finland and the Soviet Union to the end 
of the Second World War in 1945, Finland played a crucial role in the diplomatic relationship 
between Germany and the Soviet Union.  Many works on the war have erroneously dismissed 
the events that transpired in Finland preceding and during the German-Soviet war.  Finland was 
                                                          
16
 Gabriel Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1999), 48. 
17
  Ibid., 49-51. 
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instrumental not only in contributing to Hitler’s decision to go to war against the Soviet Union, 
but was also one of the major suppliers of raw materials to the Germans during the war.  Indeed, 
without Finnish nickel the Germans could hardly have accomplished what they did militarily.  
This chapter will examine both primary documents and secondary sources in order to determine 
why Finland’s role in World War II has been relegated to a mere footnote in most histories of the 
conflict. 
In 1954 Albin Anderson argued that the origin of the Winter War could be explained in 
the context of Germany’s attack upon Poland in September 1939.  The Winter War was an 
expression of the clash over Finland’s and Russia’s respective borders dating back to the 1920 
Treaty of Dorpat that was signed following Finnish independence.  The Soviets believed 
Leningrad to be insecure and the Finns believed they had given up too much to the Soviet Union 
in the Treaty of Dorpat.
18
  It was German actions, though, that provided the impetus for possible 
border revisions.  After the Austro-German Anschluss in March 1938, evidently emboldened by 
Hitler’s success, Stalin initiated talks with Finland over the issue of their shared border. Then, 
likely feeling menaced by the swift German victory over Poland, in a memorandum dated 
October 14, 1939, Stalin made clear to Finland what the Soviets required for peace: “Securing 
the safety of Leningrad” and “Becoming satisfied that Finland will have firm, friendly relations 
with the Soviet Union.”19  Essentially, the talks that followed between the USSR and Finland 
began and fell apart over the issue of Finland ceding the island of Hanko to the Soviets for use as 
a naval base.  This issue was important to both sides.  A naval base at Hanko would have 
allowed the Soviets to close the Gulf of Finland to an invading force and thus protect the city of 
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 Albin T. Anderson, “Origins of the Winter War: A Study of Russo-Finnish Diplomacy,” World Politics 
6, no. 2 (January 1954): 169. 
19
 Soviet Proposals to Finland on Territorial Changes and Defence: Memorandum to the Finnish Minister 
Paasikivi, October 14, 1939, League of Nations Official Journal, 1939, pg. 518. In Soviet Documents on Foreign 
Policy vol. 3: 1933-1939 ed. Jane Degras (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), 382. 
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Leningrad, while to the Finns it was important because such a Russian base would only be ten 
miles from the Finnish capital city of Helsinki, thus a serious threat to Finnish sovereignty.  It 
should be remembered that from 1807 until the Bolshevik Revolution, Finland had been ruled by 
the Russians.  The Russian rule was generally seen as oppressive, something that the Finnish 
people had no desire to return to.
20
  Some historians, particularly John Lukacs, have argued that 
Finland actually gained its independence from Russia in 1809 and it was not until 1900 that 
Finland lost its freedom.  This is based on the fact that the Finns were given political rights by 
the Russians they had not enjoyed under the Swedes and were in fact the best treated minority in 
any European empire in the nineteenth century.
21
  While it is true the Finns enjoyed a high 
degree of freedom under the Russians at this time, they were still part of the Russian Empire, not 
an autonomous country.  Further, most Finns did not look back at the nineteenth century as a 
period of freedom; rather, they saw it as further subjugation.  As a result, most Finns saw the 
Russians prior to the Winter War as an aggressive, oppressive neighbor.  This sentiment was 
readily apparent when Juho Kusti Paasikivi, an important Finnish politician who represented 
Finland along with Väinӧ Tanner during the Soviet-Finnish negotiations, ultimately came to the 
conclusion that it had been the Hanko issue that led to the collapse of negotiations and essentially 
war.
22
   
D.W. Spring argued in a 1986 article that the decision to invade Finland was not a light 
one and that Stalin had been willing to acquiesce if the Finns would only work with him.  Spring 
argued that Hanko was not overly important, because on November 4, 1939, Stalin had returned 
to the Soviet-Finnish discussions and shifted the Soviet demand from Hanko to other islands off 
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 David Kirby, A Concise History of Finland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 150-196. 
21
 John Lukacs, “Finland Vindicated” Foreign Affairs, 71, no. 4 (Fall 1992): 51-53. 
22
 Max Jakobson, The Diplomacy of the Winter War: An Account of the Russo-Finnish War, 1939-1940 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), 138. 
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the Hanko coast.  In Spring’s opinion this was a clear indication that the decision for war had not 
yet been made.
23
  Spring also argued that the creation of the Kuusinen government, a Moscow 
puppet government positioned in Finland, did not represent a final break in relations as well. 
However, as Timo Vihavainen has argued, Spring’s analysis is fundamentally flawed.  
Vilhavainen argued that Spring, and historians who have argued similar points, have 
misunderstood the seriousness of Soviet ideology.  The Soviets were not using the Kussinen 
government just as propaganda; rather, the Kuusinen government was a necessity for the Soviets 
to achieve their territorial desires.  Without Kuusinen the Soviets could not claim to be following 
the people of Finland’s wish to be liberated from their capitalist government.  The Kuusinen 
government was the tool by which the Soviets justified conflict with Finland.
24
  Stalin saw the 
Finns’ tenacity as a hindrance to Soviet security and the only solution was to use the Kuusinen 
government as a tool to attain the security he felt they needed. 
On the morning of November 30, 1939, the collapse of negotiations turned into war as 
the Soviet Union invaded Finland.  The invasion was based upon an earlier incident at Mainila 
where it was claimed that Finnish troops had fired upon Soviet border guards; contemporary 
research has proved this incident to be a false causus belli.
25
  For 105 days the two sides would 
wage war upon one another, with neither side gaining a clear advantage.  Olli Vehviläinen wrote 
the best description of the immediate origin of the war in his book Finland in the Second World 
War, “The Winter War of 1939-40 between Finland and the Soviet Union began with two 
mistakes.  The Finnish government believed that the Soviet Union would not attack, and Stalin 
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believed that Finland would not be capable of offering any significant resistance.”26  The 
beginning of the Winter War cannot be understood in any other context because neither side was 
prepared for the war that followed.  Marshal Mannerheim, head of Finland’s armed forces, had 
even attempted to resign from his post because of the lack of preparation of Finland’s armed 
forces leading up to November 1939.  “I did not hide from the government that the immediate 
future filled me with apprehension, and I could not conceal my surprise that government and 
Parliament had shown themselves so disinclined to pass the appropriations I had 
suggested…when we seemed to be on the threshold of war…I therefore felt compelled to declare 
that I could no longer share the responsibility for neglected armaments.”27  Luckily for Finland, 
Marshal Mannerheim would return to post once the Soviets crossed the border and Finnish forces 
were able to halt the Soviet advance. 
Despite their heroic, months-long resistance, the Finns were forced to surrender after the 
Red Army, reorganized by General Timoshenko, was able to break through the Mannerheim 
Line on February 11, 1940.
28
  This was the beginning of the end, as the Mannerheim Line was 
the main Finnish protection from the Red Army.
29
  Once it was apparent that no immediate 
military assistance would be provided by the Allies or Sweden, the Finnish government accepted 
its fate and entered peace negotiations.  The Treaty of Moscow ended the Winter War on March 
12, 1940.  The Treaty redrew the border between the Soviet Union and Finland with Finland 
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losing the city of Viipuri as well as suffering the forced leasing of Hanko to the Soviet Union.
30
  
This would not end hostilities, though, nor would the peace end the importance of Finland 
towards the development of the Second World War.  For as Waldemar Erfurth argued, “As a 
serious consequence of the sudden outbreak of the Winter War and the lack of assistance from 
other powers, the Finns were placed in a position of uncertainty.  They felt deserted and believed 
that their mighty eastern neighbor had further evil designs against their country, with the ultimate 
object of destroying its independence.”31   
Emphasis must be put on the Winter War and its significance in two important aspects.  
The first is how the Winter War was viewed by the Allies as a way to cut off Axis iron ore 
supplies from Sweden and the response in Germany to this idea.  The second is how the Winter 
War convinced Adolf Hitler that Nazi Germany could launch ‘Operation Barbarossa’ while 
simultaneously waging war in the West.  Hitler came to this conclusion because of both the poor 
showing of the Red Army in Finland and the clash of German and Soviet interests in 
Scandinavia.  As Adam Ulam argued “for the Germans, the Finnish affair was…an 
embarrassment and a temptation…It interfered with the supply of badly needed minerals from 
Finland…[but] there was the lesson once again of Russia’s military weakness and the temptation 
to press harder on her deeply compromised and isolated regime.”32  In these two aspects, the 
importance of the Winter War has been severely understated by Anglo-American historians.  By 
analyzing secondary accounts of the Winter War and Finland’s role in World War II, along with 
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primary accounts from Finnish, German, and even Allied leaders, a better understanding of those 
105 days can be arrived at.   
Winston Churchill’s The Second World War, was one of the few accounts of the Second 
World War that placed a major emphasis upon the Winter War.  Churchill argued, “I 
sympathised ardently with the Finns and supported all proposals for their aid; and I welcomed 
this new and favourable breeze as a means of achieving the major strategic advantage of cutting 
off vital iron-ore supplies of Germany.”33  This statement insinuated that the British were 
planning to use the Winter War to cut off German supplies of iron-ore from Sweden, without 
which the Third Reich could hardly have waged war.  Therefore, the Winter War was far from a 
miniscule event that did not affect the outcome of the Second World War.  On the contrary, in 
order to enervate Germany, the Allies nearly turned Scandinavia into a major theater of war.  The 
irony, of course, is that this statement also implies that the Allies would have gone to war with 
the Soviet Union, which would have made military allies out of the Soviet Union and Nazi 
Germany.  Essentially, the Allied search for any advantage against Hitler, which had led them to 
Finland, would have actually gained them another powerful enemy, the Soviet Union.  This 
would have significantly altered the course of the war and twentieth century history.  Facing two 
powerful opponents would have markedly worsened the Allied situation, especially at a time of 
limited French enthusiasm for war.  Despite his insight into Finland’s importance, Churchill 
ended his account of the Winter War episode in cavalier fashion, “On sixty days ‘Aid to Finland’ 
had been part of the Cabinet agenda.  Nothing had come of it all.  Finland had been crushed into 
submission by Russia.”34  While Churchill’s analysis of the significance of cutting off Swedish 
iron ore exports is accurate and shows the potential importance of the Winter War to the Allies, 
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his lack of a detailed analysis of the war or its conclusion shows the ambivalence that Churchill 
felt towards the Winter War, as well as his frustration with the inability of the War Cabinet to 
take action or come to any decision at all. Churchill’s interpretation is also skewed by his Anglo-
centric approach; once the British could not send troops through Scandinavia into Finland the 
Winter War lost its importance in the story of World War II, a mistake that Churchill would not 
be the only historian to make. 
The Allied interest in the Winter War did, of course, stem from the fact that they viewed 
intervention in the conflict as a way of cutting off Swedish iron ore from Germany.  The British 
Ministry of Economic Warfare in November 1939 told the War Cabinet that without Swedish 
iron ore, “Germany would be incapable of waging active war longer than twelve months.”  This 
effort to deprive Germany of vital raw materials became the primary focus of the Allies during 
the Winter War.
35
  This strategy was heightened by the view that the Finnish war would 
indirectly aggravate the supply of Soviet oil to Germany, as the Soviet Union would run out of 
its surplus in its war with Finland.  Combined with the loss of Swedish iron ore, the Allies 
believed that the German war machine would be in serious trouble by April 1940.
36
   Andrew 
Schwartz has argued that the Allied decision to aid the Finns was also based on the strategic 
consideration that the aid would keep Russia busy in Finland and incapable of posing a threat to 
Turkey and Romania, then allies of Great Britain and France.  Schwartz also considered drawing 
Norway and Sweden into the conflict as a vital consideration as well, though.
37
   On December 
19, 1939, the Allied Supreme War Council met in Paris and decided that based on the reality of 
Finland’s ability to defend itself, the Allies should offer all possible assistance to the Finns.  This 
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decision was based more upon seizing the Swedish iron ore mines and Norwegian transportation 
of the ore than on any view of helping the Finns maintain national sovereignty.
38
  As Paul Doerr 
has pointed out, by mid-March only one British brigade would actually have crossed the Swedish 
border and entered into Finland to help fight the Soviets.
39
   Strategically, this was the logical 
choice for the Allies to make.  The Soviet Union was no ally of Great Britain and France; in 
reality, the opposite was true, the Soviet Union was allied with Nazi Germany and supplying 
Germany with the oil it needed to maintain its war machine.  In fact, the Allied Powers would 
play a major role in expelling the Soviet Union from the League of Nations as a result of the 
Winter War.
40
  The Allies saw an opportunity in Finland to help cut off the oil the Germans 
needed, as well as the iron ore vital for its steel production. 
Great Britain and France were not the only countries that understood the critical impact 
that Swedish iron ore had on German war production, though.  Germany would remain neutral 
throughout the Winter War but was always keeping an eye on the Allies and the Soviet Union to 
ensure that German interests were not threatened.  For instance, on January 13, 1940, less than 
one month after the Allied Supreme War Council meeting, Adolf Hitler ordered an investigation 
to look into a hypothetical occupation of Norway in order to protect Germany’s Swedish iron-ore 
interests.  On April 9, 1940, just weeks after the Winter War ended; Germany turned that 
investigation into reality by invading Norway and Denmark.
41
  Observably, the Winter War had 
a major impact upon German thinking in the early months of 1940, with protecting Swedish iron 
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ore shipments being the main concern.  On July 19, 1940, Hitler gave a speech in which he 
justified the German invasion of Norway.  In the speech he argued,  
The conclusion of peace between Russia and Finland caused the contemplated action in 
the Northern States to be withheld at the last moment; but a few days later these 
intentions again became more definite and a final decision was reached.  Britain and 
France had agreed to carry out an immediate occupation of a number of the most 
important points in Norway under the pretext of preventing Germany from benefiting 
from further war supplies of Swedish ore.
42
   
 
While this speech came months after the Winter War, it is relevant because Hitler framed Allied 
intentions as having been formed during the Winter War and the Allied invasion of Sweden 
would have occurred had the Winter War continued.  The implication behind this statement is 
that Germany’s occupation of Norway and Denmark was legitimate because it was a means of 
protecting the German war economy from the Allies, whose true plans had not been to protect 
the democracy and sovereignty of Finland, but rather, to cripple the German war economy.  This 
speech is important because it showed that Hitler understood all along what Great Britain and 
France were really planning.  The official German history of World War II, Germany and the 
Second World War, confirms this view.  Adolf Hitler had initially viewed the Winter War as an 
advantage to German policies in the Balkans, as Stalin was tied down with Finland; however, 
once the Allies began planning an advance into Scandinavia to help Finland and secure Swedish 
iron ore, Hitler began to worry and ordered the study into an occupation of Norway.
43
  Hitler 
understood what the Allies wanted to accomplish during the Winter War; an understanding that 
would shape the way he handled the rest of the war.  
 As Hitler became more and more concerned about Soviet interests in Finland, peace 
between Finland and the Soviet Union became more and more important to Hitler.  Wipert von 
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Blücher, the German ambassador in Finland, had pointed out early during the Winter War that 
Scandinavian neutrality could not be counted on to prevent Swedish iron ore from falling into the 
wrong hands.  Sweden was within the grasp of both the Soviets and the Allies, which was a 
matter of grave concern for Germany.
44
  Neither the occupation of Finland by the Soviet Union, 
nor the continuation of the Winter War with the Allied powers now battling the Soviet Union in 
Scandinavia were viewed as favorable developments.  The latter alternative would not only cut 
off Swedish iron ore shipments, it would also render the Soviet Union a useless ally, as it would 
no longer have war material surpluses for Germany.  The only reasonable course of action, from 
the German perspective, was for peace.  Field Marshal Hermann Goering attempted to persuade 
the Finns to make peace with the Soviets in order to prevent Soviet occupation of Finland.  
Goering even promised the Finns in March 1940 they would eventually regain whatever they 
might lose in the peace to the Soviet Union, as war between the Soviet Union and Germany 
would very soon break out.
45
  Essentially, Goering was telling the Finns to avoid further trouble 
now so the Germans could help them in the future. 
 Although Adolf Hitler had always been driven by a desire to establish Lebensraum, living 
space, in the western portions of the Soviet Union, the fact remains that at the outbreak of World 
War II these plans had been at least temporarily suspended by the realities of the geopolitical 
situation of the time.
46
  The Nazi-Soviet Pact had made allies out of the two nations.  Hitler 
recognized he needed Soviet help to defeat the Western powers; the Soviet Union could wait to 
be conquered.  The Winter War, however, forced Hitler to rethink his strategy.  If the Soviet 
Union could not even conquer a small state like Finland, how could it possibly stand up to the 
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might of the Third Reich?  While the Winter War was by no means the only reason Hitler 
launched Operation Barbarossa, it certainly provided him the opportunity to see Soviet forces in 
action; Hitler was not impressed. 
 Joseph Goebbels, Germany’s Propaganda Minister, recorded in his diary on November 
11, 1939, “Russia’s army is not worth much.  Badly led and even more poorly armed.  We do not 
need their military aid.”47  While Goebbels would go on in this entry to express gratitude that 
Germany did not have to fight a two-front war, he did not express concern for the prospect of a 
second, Russian front.  This entry tells the modern scholar that even before the Winter War some 
German leaders viewed the Red Army as weak and lacking the strength necessary for a true 
world power.  On January 5, 1940, Goebbels noted, “The Russians are making absolutely no 
progress in Finland.  The Red Army really does seem to be of very little military worth.”48  It is 
important to note that at this point the Winter War had been going on for over a month, which 
implies that Goebbels’s view of the Red Army was becoming embedded in his mind: the Red 
Army was seen as weak and inefficient in conquering even the smallest of states, Finland. 
 Albert Speer, Adolf Hitler’s Minister of Armaments and War Production, wrote in his 
memoirs that Hitler first became aware of Red Army deficiencies when German troops met 
Soviet troops on the demarcation line in Poland.  This had a profound effect upon Hitler, as he 
often quoted this as proof of a Soviet lack of strength.  Speer also noted, “Soon afterward, the 
failure of the Soviet offensive against Finland confirmed him in this view.”49  Once again here 
was a top Nazi official, who was very close to Adolf Hitler, arguing that the Winter War had a 
major impact on Hitler’s view of Red Army strength.  The poor appearance of the Red Army in 
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Poland was enough to initially put into Hitler’s mind that the Germans could succeed in an 
invasion of the Soviet Union, but the Winter War confirmed this idea.  Without the Winter War 
it is possible that Hitler would not have invaded the Soviet Union until a much later time, but the 
Winter War showed Hitler an invasion could be successful.   
 In the autumn of 1939, however, Hitler had no immediate plan to invade the Soviet 
Union.  Hitler wanted to keep Germany out of a war with the Soviet Union, even if it meant 
giving up Finland and the Baltic states, traditional spheres of German influence.
50
  Hitler was 
content to wage war with Great Britain and France and once they were brought under Nazi 
control turn to his original goal of Lebensraum in the East.  However, as Eloise Engle and Lauri 
Paanenen argued, “For the Germans, had the Soviet Union not appeared so unfavorable, Hitler 
would hardly have underestimated the war potential of the Russians to the extent he did.  
Considering the enormous effort put forth by the Soviets in Finland, very little was received in 
the way of results.”51  Richard J. Evans, famed Third Reich historian, also came to the same 
conclusion arguing in his book The Third Reich at War, “[Finland’s] tough and effective 
resistance had exposed the weakness of the Red Army and convinced Hitler that he had nothing 
to fear from it.”52  On the other hand, Jukka Nevakivi has argued that the poor performance of 
the Red Army was only as important, not more important, than the fact the German campaign 
against the British was going so poorly.  Nevakivi argued, “War against the Soviet Union would 
have come sooner or later…If Hitler decided to start it in 1941…the reason was as much the lack 
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of progress in his operations against England as the impression of a state of weakness given by 
the Soviet Union in the Winter War, an advantage which he did not wish to lose.”53 
 It was not just the weak military showing of the Red Army during the Winter War that 
persuaded Adolf Hitler to launch ‘Operation Barbarossa,’ it became obvious after the Winter 
War that German and Soviet interests were eventually going to clash.  Indeed, a November 25, 
1940, statement made by Molotov illustrated what would become the crux of the deterioration in 
German-Soviet relations.  The statement was made to a German ambassador on the issue of a 
possible Four-Power Pact, involving Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Soviet Union, and the 
requirements that needed to be obtained before the Russians would sign it.  The first requirement 
was: “Provided that the German troops are immediately withdrawn from Finland, which, under 
the agreements of 1939, belongs to the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence.  Here the Soviet 
Union undertakes to ensure peaceful relations with Finland and safeguard German economic 
interests in Finland (export of lumber and nickel).”54  The period between the end of the Winter 
War and the launching of ‘Operation Barbarossa’ was increasingly defined by the issue of 
Finnish nickel and who was going to be in charge of that nickel. 
 H. Peter Krosby’s 1968 book, Finland, Germany and the Soviet Union: The 
PetsamoDispute, argued that the Petsamo nickel question dominated the political relations 
between Finland, Germany, and the Soviet Union.  The issue came down to who would be in 
charge of the Finnish nickel mines in Petsamo, Germany or the Soviet Union?  Krosby showed 
this was the dominant issue in the diplomatic correspondence between Germany and Finland 
following the Winter War.  German military leaders had calculated that without Finnish nickel 
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their war economy would collapse, making the Petsamo issue a top priority for the Germans.  
Petsamo became a major issue when the Soviet Union decided that it was going to be in charge 
of Petsamo, although giving a guarantee to Germany that it would honor the output of nickel 
promised to the Germans.  The Germans did not trust the Soviet’s with such a vital part of their 
war economy and began planning for their armies in Norway to secure the Petsamo area once 
‘Operation Barbarossa’ was launched.55   
 While Krosby did not argue that the Petsamo question was a factor in the decision to 
launch ‘Operation Barbarossa,’ he did argue that by August of 1940 Hitler had decided if the 
Russians attempted to annex Finland again, the Germans would occupy Petsamo and begin 
arming the Finns.  Krosby argued, “Hitler was not yet ready to take on the Soviet Union in a total 
conflict of arms, but he was willing to risk a quarrel over Petsamo if necessary.”56  General Franz 
Halder’s diary concurs with Krosby’s interpretation.  After the August 26, 1940, conference with 
the Fuehrer, Halder noted, “Finland would get arms and ammunition from us.  In the event of a 
Russian attack against Finland, we shall occupy Petsamo.”57 From this one can infer that whether 
or not Hitler was ready to take on the Soviet Union, occupying Petsamo and arming the Finns 
would have begun the conflict.  This is where Krosby made a mistake in his reasoning, he did not 
envisage what would occur once the Germans occupied Petsamo, or what that occupation would 
mean; effectively, that Germany would be at war with the Soviet Union.  Obviously, these 
August decisions by Hitler were of momentous importance, yet they have been left out of many 
scholarly works on the Second World War, including Gorodetsky’s account.  This has been an 
oversight because these decisions show that by August 1940, Hitler was not just planning and 
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scheming, he was ready to take action against the Red Army if his hand was forced.  The August 
decision to occupy Petsamo, if necessary, and the implications it necessitated, effectively, adds 
validity to Hitler’s July 31, 1940, decision to begin planning for an invasion of Russia.  Although 
some historians have considered this not yet a “point of no return;” they have conceded that the 
interests of Finland and Romania had to be safeguarded as a result of that decision.
58
  
 Official Finnish documents show that the Soviet Union had began to insist on control of 
the Petsamo nickel mines on June 23, 1940, and from that point on it became a constant strain on 
German, Finnish, and Soviet relations.
59
  By June 27, 1940, the Soviets had informed the Finns 
that they were not interested in the actual nickel; rather, the Soviet Union was interested in the 
area itself and controlling the nickel within the area for “all time.”60  The Germans had been 
ensured by the Finns that the Petsamo nickel mines would be operated primarily for German 
usage; after June 27, though, the Germans now had to worry about their nickel supplies.  Hitler 
would begin to plan for an invasion of the Soviet Union in July, and it would be irrational to 
believe that this event had nothing to do with that decision.  This connection was especially 
relevant considering that Hitler was ready by August to take action if the Soviet Union tried to 
invade Finland again.  
 On October 30, 1940, the Soviet Union began threatening Finland in regards to the 
Petsamo nickel mines.  Paasikivi sent a telegram to the Finnish Foreign Ministry on that day that 
in response to the Finnish claims that they could not give the concession to the Soviet Union 
because of the concession already made to the British, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vyshinski 
                                                          
58
 Jürgen Fӧrster, “Hitler’s Decision in Favour of War against the Soviet Union,” in Germany and the 
Second World War vol. IV: The Attack on the Soviet Union, ed. Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1998), 28-29. 
59
 Hjalmar Johan Frederik Procopé, ed., Finland Reveals Her Secret Documents on Soviet Policy, March 
1940-June 1941. The Attitude of the USSR to Finland after the Peace of Moscow (New York: W. Funk Inc., 1941), 
50-99. 
60
 Paasikivi to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, June 27, 1940, in Finland Reveals Her Secret Documents 
on Soviet Policy, 51. 
31 
 
told Paasikivi, “in that case the USSR would be compelled to take the measures which the 
situation demanded.”61  At this point, then, the Petsamo issue had ceased to be unimportant, but 
rather was a possible casus belli.  The Germans could not sit back and watch the Russians 
pressure and threaten Finland, at least not over an issue that directly affected their military 
abilities.  The Germans were still trying to defeat the British and had been planning for the 
invasion of Russia for months at this point.  To lose the nickel from Finland would have been too 
much for the Germans to accept.  The Germans had also, it should be remembered, decided in 
August that they would take action if Russia took up arms against Finland. 
 Further, a January 1941 conversation between Hitler and the Italian dictator Benito 
Mussolini furthers this argument.  At the Berghof, Hitler indicated that Germany would have 
gone further in supporting Finland against Russia.  “The Russians, [Hitler] said, had agreed to let 
Germany have the necessary nickel supplies but would not hold to their agreement any longer 
than suited them; therefore, he could not permit further Soviet encroachments in Finland.”62  
What beyond the occupation of Petsamo Hitler would have risked will never be known; but it is 
obvious that Hitler would have gone to war in August 1940 if the Russians had tried to annex the 
Finns.  Hitler would not have allowed the nickel, so vital to his war machine, to go without a 
fight, primarily because in his mind Scandinavia was the keystone of his empire.
63
  It is not much 
of a jump to conclude that in Hitler’s mind Finland was worth launching a war for, as evidenced 
by his statements and his actions. 
 In August 1940, Field Marshal Feodor von Bock wrote in his diary about the state of 
German foreign relations at that point.  Bock stated, “Russia had once shown a tendency to go 
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beyond the agreements with us, however at the moment she is loyal…Should she prepare to 
crush Finland or attack Romania we would be forced to intervene.  Russia must not be allowed to 
become the sole master of the Eastern Baltic and we need the Romanian oil.”64  Here is another 
example of top German leadership in August 1940 insinuating that Germany would not allow the 
Soviet Union to interfere in Finland without German intervention. This is another example of 
how Gorodetsky got the circumstances wrong because it showed it was not just Romania and the 
Balkans the German leadership were concerned about, but rather they were worried about the 
Baltic and Finland as well.  Bock finished the entry by stating, “But perhaps sending a German 
General with a “provocative” name to the east would be enough to keep Russia quiet.”65  This 
conclusion showed that Bock was not fully convinced that the Germans needed to go to war at 
that time, but they needed to start acting to safeguard their interests. 
 The head of the OKW, Field Marshal Keitel, wrote in his memoirs of Hitler’s decision to 
go to war with the Soviet Union this way: 
His reply, in brief, was that he had never lost sight of the inevitability of a clash between 
the world’s two most diametrically opposed ideologies, that he did not believe it could be 
evaded, and that that being the case it was better for him to shoulder this grave burden 
now, in addition to the others, than for him to bequeath it to his successor.  Besides, he 
believed there were indications that Russia was already girding herself for war with us, 
and she had certainly far overreached the agreements we had made on the Baltic 
provinces and Bessarabia while our hands had been tied in the west.  In any case, he said, 
he only wanted to take precautions against being taken by surprise, and he would not 
reach any decisions until he had recognised how justified his distrust of them was.
66
 
This reminiscence from a conversation he had with Hitler illustrated many things about the 
reasons for going to war with the Soviet Union.  First, as Gorodetsky argued, the decision was 
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not based solely upon Nazi ideology that could be traced back to Mein Kampf, rather it was 
based upon the realities of the geopolitical events of the time.  Hitler told Keitel that he did not 
think he could shoulder the burden of not taking precautions against the Soviet Union because of 
the Soviet actions in Bessarabia and the Baltic.  It is important to remember that in terms of 
German-Soviet relations Finland was included in the Baltic bloc of nations.  Essentially, this 
conversation indicated that the decision to invade the Soviet Union was based more upon the 
realities of German-Soviet relations and preventing the Soviets from taking raw materials the 
Germans needed from Finland and Rumania.  The conclusion that Hitler would not take any 
action until his distrust was justified showed that Hitler needed a little more encouragement to 
commit to the invasion; that encouragement would come in November, 1940. 
 In describing the November 1940 Molotov visit to Berlin, Gerhard Weinberg  phrased it 
best in his 1954 book, Germany and the Soviet Union, 1939-1941; “ of the thirty-six pages 
compromising the memoranda on Molotov’s conversations with Hitler… seven are taken up by 
rather acrimonious debate about the…interests of Russia and Germany in Finland.  Before the 
decision to attack Russia, Germany had been willing to see the Soviets conquer that country; 
now they meant to protect it as an ally for the coming war.”67  The November visit would 
finalize German plans on what to do about the Soviet Union; if there had been any thought of 
avoiding a conflict, it ended in November.  The main problem that arose during the talks was the 
issue of Finland and Hitler’s demand that Molotov indicate what the Soviet intentions were for 
Finland.  Molotov requested that Hitler remove German troops that were on their way to Norway 
from Finland.  When Hitler asked him what the Soviet intentions towards Finland were Molotov 
responded that the Soviets wanted a settlement in the same manner as Bessarabia, which the 
Soviet’s had annexed months prior to the conference.  Hitler responded to this that there must not 
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be any war in Finland because it would have severe repercussions on German-Soviet relations.
68
  
As Stephen Fritz has pointed out, Molotov even pressed Hitler about German actions in Romania 
and Finland and how they had violated the 1939 German-Soviet agreement, which lead Fritz to 
the conclusion that Hitler had decided by the second day of the meeting that German and Soviet 
interests were not compatible.
69
  Essentially, the meeting can be seen as Germany’s warning that 
they would not allow Finland to be annexed by the Soviet Union. 
 General Heinz Guderian wrote of Molotov’s November visit in his memoirs, Panzer 
Leader.  Guderian argued that Molotov had demanded that the Germans recognize the Soviet 
interests in Finland, Romania, Bulgaria, and the Dardanelles, and that an agreement was to be 
made in regards to the future of Poland.  Hitler, according to Guderian, was “highly incensed” by 
the Russian claims.  Guderian wrote, “The conclusion [Hitler] drew from Molotov’s visit and its 
results was a belief that war with the Soviet Union must sooner or later be inevitable.  He was to 
describe to me repeatedly the course that the Berlin conference took; I have given his version 
here.”70  The implication from this passage is that Finland and the November negotiations played 
a role in Hitler’s decision to go to war with the Soviet Union.  While Gorodetsky and other 
historians have placed the blame solely on events in the Balkans as the driving force in that 
decision; Guderian makes it apparent that it was not solely the Balkans, but rather the 
international situation as a whole that Hitler took into consideration in declaring war. 
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 The November visit had not accomplished the renewal of relations that the Soviet’s were 
hoping for.  The initial Finnish view of the meeting was published in the 1941 book, Finland 
Reveals Her Secret Documents on Soviet Policy.  This book was a compilation of documents 
from March 1940 to June 1941 and was prefaced by the Finnish ambassador to the United States, 
Hjalmar J. Procopé.  The book argued, “The aims of the USSR in regard to Finland found a 
striking expression during the visit of…Molotov to Berlin in November, 1940.  In the course of 
the negotiations…Molotov proposed that the USSR should be allowed to attack Finland a second 
time, without interference by Germany.”71  While this was clearly propaganda, it is also 
illustrative of the way the Finnish government, and to an extent the German government, saw the 
actions and suggestions of the Soviet government.  After all, the Soviets just after the November 
talks in Berlin had lied to the Finns on November 19 and told them that Germany had consented 
to Russia gaining the concession to the nickel mines in Petsamo and would not stand in the way 
of a Russian takeover of the mines.
72
  Clearly, Hitler had made no such concession and had only 
a few months before in August decided the Petsamo nickel mines were worth launching an early 
invasion of the Soviet Union.  It is interesting that this should happen between the Molotov visit 
and the issuing of Directive No. 21, considering the Finns had informed the Germans of 
Molotov’s lie.  In fact, during the post-war interrogations Ribbentrop even suggested that the 
fallout over Finland during the November meeting had been one of the factors determining the 
decision to invade the Soviet Union; although Ribbentrop himself stated he was opposed to such 
an action.
73
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 A little over a month after Molotov’s visit to Berlin Hitler on December 18, 1940, issued 
his “Directive No. 21,” which called for ‘Operation Barbarossa.’  The directive opened by 
stating, “The German Armed Forces must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia in a quick 
campaign (Operation Barbarossa) even before the conclusion of the war against England.”74  The 
decision had been made, now all that remained was to implement ‘Operation Barbarossa’ in the 
following spring.  As far as Finland was concerned, the Directive stated, “On the flanks of our 
operation we can count on the active participation of Rumania and Finland in the war against 
Soviet Russia.”75  Thus, the Germans were already assured that Finland would play an active role 
in the invasion of the Soviet Union.  Directive No. 21 is important because the timing of its 
release showed that the invasion of Russia was not merely an ideological event; rather, the 
invasion was a calculated attempt by Hitler and the German leadership to ensure that their main 
suppliers of raw materials, Romania and Finland, would remain free to comply with German 
wishes.  Obviously, then, the decision to launch ‘Operation Barbarossa’ can be seen as being 
directly affected by the Molotov visit, as well as events in the Balkans; not solely the ideological 
fantasies of Adolf Hitler.   
A distinction should be made between the German desire to include both Romania and 
Finland into its operational plans for the East.  Finnish historian Michael Jonas has argued that 
Romania was incorporated into the German plans specifically for its oil reserves, which were the 
second largest in Europe at this time.  This is why Hitler’s first order in Romania was for the oil 
fields to be occupied and secured for German use.  Militarily, the Romanians had little to offer 
the Germans; Romanian troops were seen as cowardly, useless, and lacking discipline in the Nazi 
eyes.  Indeed, retreating Romanian troops were regularly abused, along with Italian and 
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Hungarian troops, by German forces; sometimes with hand grenades thrown at them by the 
German troops.  The Finnish, in comparison, were valued not just for the critical resource of 
nickel, but for their military strengths.  The Winter War had shown the value of Finland as a 
military ally and Hitler was very fond of Marshal Mannerheim as “the embodiment of the anti-
Bolshevist Finnish soldier.”  As Jonas argued, “While in the Romanian case war economic 
considerations dominated military planning, the case of Finland appeared much more complex.  
A high German opinion of Finnish military capacities and comparatively blunt economic 
calculations seem to have been kept in a carefully calibrated balance throughout.”76  Jonas’s 
argument furthers the notion that Finland was a special case, in terms of Nazi relations, and 
should be studied as a separate case.   
 According to Gorodetsky events in the Balkans, specifically Soviet actions in Bulgaria, 
Yugoslavia, and Bessarabia, all precipitated the decision to invade the Soviet Union.  However, 
as can clearly be seen, both the July 1940 decision and Directive No. 21 were issued well before 
the events in Bulgaria or Yugoslavia, meaning these events had little impact on the initial 
decision to launch ‘Operation Barbarossa.’  However, Gorodetsky’s argument in favor of the 
annexation of Bessarabia is still a valid point, but it needs to be put into the proper context that it 
shared equal importance with Finland in the decision to launch ‘Operation Barbarossa.’  
Historians have for far too long understated the importance Finland had upon the German 
decision to go to war with the Soviet Union.  It is clear that Finland was not the sole driving 
force behind the decision, but Finland did play a critical role in shaping that force.  As Anatole 
Mazour pointed out in his book Finland: Between East and West, “The experience of the Winter 
War taught the Finns one lesson—Sweden would not give the military aid that was required to 
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halt Soviet encroachment.  A second lesson…[was that] Soviet demands continued to be pressed 
in regard to transit privileges in order to link the home base with the recently acquired one at 
Hanko.”77  The Finns realized that if they were to survive another Winter War experience they 
were going to have to reenter the German sphere of influence.  At the same time Germany 
realized its interests in Finland were continuously threatened by Soviet action against Finland.  
The Soviet response was, as Mazour put it, “The more Helsinki and Berlin drew together, the 
greater became the fear in Moscow and eagerness to find additional insurance against a German 
place d’armes in Finland.  In June the Soviet government began to insist upon a controlling share 
in the Petsamo Nickel Company.”78 
The Finland situation, then, can clearly be shown as one of the major breaking points in 
German-Soviet relations.  As the Finns moved closer to the Germans, the Soviets moved further 
from both the Germans and the Finns.  Desperation on both sides was beginning to show. The 
German August 1940 decision to occupy Petsamo if the Soviet Union invaded Finland once 
again showed that the Germans now recognized two things: Finland’s nickel output was 
absolutely essential, even worth the risk of an early war with the Soviet Union; and the Germans 
had seen an alliance with the Soviet Union was not good for their interests in Scandinavia.  The 
role the Finns played in the decision to invade the Soviet Union has continued to be one of the 
most under covered aspects of World War II amongst English-speaking historians, despite the 
abundance of evidence of the importance Finland played in the years 1939 to 1944. 
 
 
 
                                                          
77
 Anatole Mazour, Finland: Between East and West (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1956), 
135. 
78
 Ibid., 135. 
39 
 
CHAPTER 3 
SWEDEN: THE NATION THAT KEPT ADOLF HITLER AFLOAT 
Sweden has, after all, done more for the German war effort than is generally assumed.  
More particularly, Sweden has given us valuable support in our fight against the Soviet 
Union.  While she insists on remaining neutral, that after all is very much in our favor.  
There can be no doubt but that she would defend her neutrality by force of arms in case 
we tried to put her under pressure.
79
    Joseph Goebbels, January 28, 1942 
 
The English intended establishing a connection with the eastern theater of war via 
Sweden.  But the Swedes are determined to oppose by force of arms anybody who attacks 
their territory.  At least that’s what they say today.  It would have been better if we had 
also taken Sweden during our campaign in the north.  This state has no right to national 
existence anyway.
80
   Joseph Goebbels, April 15, 1942 
 
These quotations from German Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels’s diary illustrate 
well the ambiguities and tensions in the German-Swedish relationship during World War II.  In 
the first quotation Goebbels praised Sweden for all she had done for the German war effort, 
primarily in the supply of iron ore and allowing Germany to transfer troops through Sweden.  
These actions had helped the Germans wage war successfully up to that point.  By the middle of 
April 1942, though, Goebbels had changed his mind.  The Swedes had become a problem in 
Goebbels’s mind, primarily because the Germans worried whether Sweden would remain neutral 
throughout the continuation of the war.  These diary entries are symbolic of Sweden’s Second 
World War experience, as Sweden began the war as one of Germany’s favorite nations and 
would end the war as a constant nuisance to the Germans.  This chapter will first examine 
Sweden as a favorite of the Germans, when Sweden was supplying Germany with the necessary 
iron ore to continue the war.  Then the chapter will shift its focus, much as Swedish-German 
relations did in response to the vagaries of war, and illustrate the tensions in the relationship, 
especially as the Swedes actively hindered the success of the Final Solution in Scandinavia.  
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Throughout the analysis of these topics, close attention will be placed upon how historians and 
academics have interpreted these events, specifically how Anglo-American historians have 
viewed these events. 
In 1939, the German economy appeared to be growing.  The Anschluss with Austria, as 
well as the incorporation of Czechoslovakia, had increased German industrial strength and 
agricultural output.  As the official German history of World War II argued:  
Although the economic domination  which Germany had now attained over the countries 
of south-east Europe had brought the regime a good step nearer to the establishment of its 
large-scale economic area, [German] economic strength thus acquired was still not 
sufficient—with any reasonable hope of success—either for a war of revenge against 
France, with the risk of British involvement, or for a struggle for living-space in the east, 
i.e. against the Soviet Union, which was itself conducting mutual-aid negotiations with 
the Western powers.
81
   
This would become important because Germany realized well before the invasion of Poland that 
the German economy would require an expansion of raw materials.  The ability to wage war had 
not been increased by the territorial acquisitions thus achieved.  Adolf Hitler recognized this and 
understood that Germany needed to continue focusing on gaining the raw materials that would be 
essential to fighting the Allied Powers or the Soviet Union.  Before the German decision to 
invade Poland had been finalized there had been concern from many high-level Nazis that 
Germany could not fight a long war because of its raw material deficiencies, Hitler, though, used 
these deficiencies as a reason to invade Poland.  In Hitler’s mind the Germans would benefit 
from the added Polish raw materials, whereas postponing the invasion would allow Great Britain 
and other major world powers the opportunity to continue mobilizing at a higher speed than 
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Germany.
82
   Richard Overy has argued that upon the invasion of Poland Hitler did not expect 
war to break out.  Hitler thought the Allied Powers would simply grant him what he wanted and 
move on.  The invasion of Poland was undertaken so that Nazi Germany would have a core base 
of Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland to draw resources from for a future long-term war 
against either the Allied Powers or Soviet Russia.  A war with Great Britain and France was not 
supposed to start as a result of the invasion of Poland because the Nazi-Soviet Pact would act as 
a check on a Western response.
83
 
The main economic policy of Nazi Germany leading up to the Second World War was 
the Four Year Plan, which called for Germany to become independent of other countries 
economically.  As William Ebenstein argued in 1943, though, “The Four Year Plan was never 
designed to be a permanent solution for Germany’s problem of raw materials…The sole purpose 
of the Four Year Plan was to make sure that Germany would win the second World War…after 
victory all raw materials would be at the disposal of the German master race in an enslaved 
world.”84  Ebenstein’s argument implies that the Anschluss with Austria and the occupation of 
Czechoslovakia were undertaken as a way to increase the material wealth of the German Reich 
in order to be capable of fighting the long war against Great Britain and France or the Soviet 
Union.  This is an important idea to comprehend because it allows one to fully understand what 
Nazi intentions were heading into 1939.  The goal was not to start a major war, but instead the 
goal was to gain Polish raw materials that could be used to strengthen Germany for a future war.  
As Ebenstein pointed out, the theory of the Nazi war economy, Wehrwirtschaft, was to obtain the 
means for total war during peace time.  Obtaining the resources under peace would allow the 
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Germans to prepare for the long war, the lack of such preparations was something leading 
German economists and military leaders believed had cost them victory in the First World War.
85
 
Hitler himself shed light on the issue of gaining the independence of raw materials 
through the acquisition of other territories.  In his New Years Proclamation speech to the German 
population on January 1, 1939, Hitler argued, “The third task we see in the execution of the Four 
Years Plan, is the solution of the problem of labour shortage, and, above all, in the economic 
incorporation of the new territories of the Reich.”86  The context of this comment was Adolf 
Hitler telling the German people what the major problems Germany had to solve in 1939.  The 
foreign territories that are mentioned were Austria and the Sudetenland area of Czechoslovakia.  
What this speech was essentially saying in terms of economics was that Germany was going to 
incorporate these nations’ raw materials into the German system in order to continue the building 
up of the Wehrwirtschaft.  The economic incorporation of these territories was of the utmost 
importance because Hitler understood that the Reich needed these materials if Germany was to 
achieve an economy capable of fighting Great Britain and France or the Soviet Union.  This was 
also the stated goal for 1939, the year that the Germans would attempt to incorporate another 
nation into the Reich, Poland. 
The only way that Germany could continue building the Wehrwirtschaft was by 
continuing the expansion of German dominated territory.  This, though, does not mean that 
Germany moved on Poland with the intention of starting a world war.  As Gerhard Weinberg 
argued, “Hitler was preparing for a series of wars each of which Germany would win by 
launching a quick campaign against an isolated enemy, with victory in each such war helping 
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prepare for the next one by increasing Germany’s resources and terrifying others into submission 
or at least abstention from intervention.”87  A grand war was never the strategy, just a local war 
with Poland.  This would lead to other wars, including against Great Britain and France, but 
those would be for the future, after Germany had incorporated the resources of Poland into the 
Reich.  Unfortunately for Hitler and Nazi Germany, Great Britain and France would not let 
Poland be occupied without a fight, and on September 3, 1939, they would declare war on 
Germany. 
As a result of Great Britain and France declaring war, Hitler had to consolidate and 
protect the areas that were providing the Nazi war machine with raw materials.  The 
incorporation into the Reich of new territories in order to enrich the Wehrwirtschaft had been the 
primary goal of Nazi policy in the late 1930s.  With a major war came the realization that the 
Reich simply did not have enough raw materials to wage a war against the combined might of 
Great Britain and France.  One of the key raw materials to fighting these powers would be iron 
ore.  In this way, Sweden would become one of the most important countries of the Second 
World War despite being neutral throughout the conflict.  Without Swedish iron ore the Nazi’s 
could not have waged war.   
Sweden and her iron ore became important to the German economy because of the 
quality and easy access Germany had to it.  By 1939, Sweden accounted for over half of the iron 
ore imported into Germany; Sweden’s importance was also strengthened by the fact that once 
war began, Great Britain and France could choose to halt their exportation of iron ore to 
Germany.
88
  The importation of Swedish iron ore would rise from 3.3 million tons in 1935 to 
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5.45 million in 1937 and to 6.2 million in 1939.
89
  The importation of Swedish iron ore rose as 
the Wehrwirtschaft continued to grow.  It can then be argued that the importation of Swedish 
iron ore was rising because Hitler was preparing Germany for the long war by greatly increasing 
German production of armaments and other war goods.  In this long war German industrialists 
would need access to large amounts of the highest grade of iron ore in Europe in order to make 
the war materials that the German army would need to conquer its foes. 
To fully understand how important Swedish iron ore was to Germany, one only needs to 
look to the year 1940.  Germany had traditionally enjoyed good economic relations with Sweden, 
but Sweden was not Germany’s only trading partner in terms of iron ore.  Germany also acquired 
iron ore from France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and even Spain.  When the war began, though, 
Germany found itself with a 40 percent drop in its iron ore importation.  As Burton H. Klein has 
pointed out, “Had the Allies been able to cut off Swedish iron ore supplies, as was feared in 
Germany, the German steel industry could not have operated at more than 50 per cent of capacity 
during 1940 without depleting ore and scrap stocks.”90  In reality, this means that the Swedes 
kept the German war economy functional during the early stages of the war.  1940 alone 
represents the impact that Swedish iron ore had on Germany because it was a year in which 
Sweden was the only major supplier of iron ore to Germany.   
Hitler and the Nazi military leaders had never entertained any plans of conquering 
Sweden or other Scandinavian areas.  In the Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt’s history of 
the war Klaus A. Maier argued that although the German navy had been interested in widening 
its base of operations into Scandinavia in order to escape the British control of the Atlantic while 
simultaneously securing iron ore imports from Sweden, there had been no operational plans 
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drawn up before the war.
91
  This region was never intended to be a part of German plans of 
conquest in the way that Czechoslovakia or Poland had been.  Gunnar Hägglӧf, who served in 
the Swedish Foreign Ministry during World War II, has pointed out that the Anglo-German 
Naval Agreement of 1935 had led to the British renouncing any influence in the Baltic and had 
thus furthered Hitler’s belief that this had made Germany into the master of the Baltic; therefore, 
to the Germans, Sweden was to provide the Reich with all of the iron ore it would need.
92
  On the 
face of it, there was no reason for Germany to become involved in Scandinavia, since Germany 
informally controlled the area and it supplied enough iron ore to build its war machine.  When 
the long war broke out early, though, Sweden and the rest of Scandinavia became extremely 
important to a Reich that had not conquered the necessary territories to defeat Great Britain and 
France.  Indeed, the Wehrmacht High Command had already conducted a study on April 29, 
1939, that came to the conclusion that during a war iron ore shipments from Sweden would fall 
because of the threat of British blockade.  Even if imports only fell by 3 million tons, the 
Wehrmacht High Command concluded that this would not be acceptable for a war that lasted 
longer than six months.
93
 
Hitler would not be in trouble during the invasion of Poland as long as the Allies 
continued the policy of appeasement and stayed uninvolved in the conflict.  Poland would resist 
German occupation, but the German military understood this conflict would not last longer than 
six months.  Hitler was confident that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with the Soviet Union would 
prevent Great Britain and France from entering the conflict.  When the Allies declared war, 
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though, the short war that would not exceed six months became the long war that Hitler was not 
prepared for.  The study that the Wehrmacht High Command had conducted would become 
important as Hitler and other top Nazi officials understood the gravity of the situation they now 
found themselves in.  It was for this reason that the Germans sought to protect Swedish iron ore 
at all costs. 
The importance of Swedish iron ore would manifest itself into the German operation for 
the invasion of Norway and Denmark, Weserübung.  German Admiral Erich Raeder had long 
been campaigning for the invasion of these nations in order to protect the vital raw materials that 
Scandinavia generated for the German economy, principally Swedish iron ore and Finnish 
nickel.  The Norwegian port of Narvik was one of the few areas that could ship these resources 
all year round and Raeder believed it was of the utmost importance to protect this shipping lane, 
especially once war broke out with Great Britain and France.  Hitler, though, at an April 1 
conference with his military leaders suggested that Operation Weserübung was important not just 
for protecting these raw materials.  Hitler attempted to link the invasion of Norway to the bigger 
picture of the long war by arguing to his generals that the invasion would finally allow Germany 
access to the open sea.  In Hitler’s opinion it was intolerable that Germany should have to be 
confronted, generation after generation, with British pressure in naval matters.  Hitler argued that 
Weserübung was part of a larger operation against the British that was an inevitable conflict, 
especially after the British declaration of war.  Indeed, as Maier argued these occupations of 
Denmark and Norway were intended to become permanent, as these nations would be brought 
within Greater Germany, and were not just temporary wartime exigency.
94
 
Swedish iron ore was so vital to the German war economy because, as Martin Fritz has 
shown, the high quality of the ore meant less ore had to be shipped.  This relieved the German 
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transportation bottleneck that had long been plaguing German industry.
95
  The idea that Sweden 
prolonged the war because of her trade with Germany comes from this indisputable fact.  
However, Germany was not receiving the iron ore for free, as Germany was trading large sums 
of coal for that ore.  As Fritz pointed out, many historians who have argued that Sweden 
prolonged the war have failed to realize the huge impact this coal trade had on the Wehrmacht 
and the invasion of the Soviet Union.  The Wehrmacht was running low on coal throughout the 
invasion of the Soviet Union, which hampered success.
96
  Of course, Fritz does not expand on 
this argument, but it is worth mentioning, especially considering how many Swedish historians 
have argued the immorality of the Swedish government’s actions during the Second World War.  
Remembering that Sweden was totally isolated from the rest of the world and was receiving 
large quantities of desperately needed coal from Germany in exchange for iron ore should temper 
somewhat the critical view of some historians that Sweden provided iron ore to Nazi Germany 
primarily to enable that country to conduct war.  Instead, the reality was more about survival as a 
sovereign, if not quite fully autonomous, nation. 
In his book The Wages of Destruction, Adam Tooze argued that Swedish iron ore was 
vital to the German war economy because if shipments from Sweden had stopped following the 
invasion of Poland, the German armaments industry would have been “subject to a drastic 
squeeze” during the autumn of 1940 at the latest.97  Tooze also points out that there was no real 
threat of Germany losing Sweden’s support because of the fact that Germany was Sweden’s 
main supplier of coal.  Sweden, then, was never in any danger of turning from pro-German 
neutrality because of the economic reality of Swedish reliance on German coal.  Tooze then 
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argued that the danger of losing Swedish iron ore lay in a British invasion of Norway and 
detailed the German invasion and defeat of Britain in Norway.
98
  What is most striking about 
Tooze’s analysis of Sweden’s key role is its brevity.  Tooze conceded that without Swedish iron 
ore the Germans could not have made it past the autumn of 1940 but does not spend any time 
actually analyzing this situation in his book.  This is representative of the problem in the English-
speaking historiography of the Second World War and Sweden’s role in the war.  No American 
or British historian adequately covers this aspect of the war in any detail.  It is simply argued that 
Swedish iron ore was valuable to the German war economy and Norway was invaded to protect 
this iron ore with little interest in the full implications of this assertion. 
The non-English historiography of the Second World War has long debated if Sweden 
could have ended the war by cutting off iron ore shipments to the Germans.  In 1965 Rolf 
Karlbom authored an article that argued that if the Swedish mines had ceased working following 
the German invasion of Poland up to the fall of France, than the German industrial sector would 
have shut down as well.  Essentially, Karlbom argued that the Swedes had allowed World War II 
to happen by sticking with neutrality and not shutting the Nazi’s out of the iron ore trade.  This, 
of course, would incite many academics to argue against Karlbom’s thesis, including Alan 
Milward and Jӧrg-Johannes Jäger.  Milward argued that Karlbom’s figures were wrong by 
pointing out that Germany’s consumption of Swedish iron ore dropped from 51 percent in the 
last three months of 1939 to just over 25 percent in the first three months of 1940, which showed 
that rather than being the essential factor in Germany’s ability to wage war in the early period, 
Swedish iron ore actually ceased to be as important as in the beginning.  In addition, Milward 
pointed out that German stockpiles were high enough before the invasion of France to survive 
the lack of imports of iron ore.  Jäger also attacked Karlbom’s figures, arguing that Karlbom 
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based his numbers on pre-1938 German borders and not the actual Germany that included 
Austria, Czechoslovakia, and parts of Poland.
99
  While the idea that Sweden could have stopped 
the war before the fall of France has been disproven by historians and academics, the idea that 
Swedish iron ore allowed the German army to accomplish all that it did is one of the few aspects 
of World War II that all historians agree on. 
Rolf-Dieter Müller has made a different argument than most historians on the question of 
Swedish iron ore and Germany.  Müller asserted that the German economy following the 
invasion of Poland was faced with a raw material crisis.  Up to this point, the Germans had 
conquered territories that yielded very little in terms of raw materials that could sustain a long 
war.  As a result, Germany found itself in a “Gordian knot,” where arms manufacturers were 
suffering from a shortage of iron that was caused by the erratic deliveries from Sweden of iron 
ore.  The solution to this Gordian knot was to replace the erratic deliveries from Sweden with the 
iron-ore producing regions of Belgium and northern France as soon as possible.  Müller 
concludes that this was the fundamental problem with the German war economy, instead of 
rationalizing the production of war materials and alleviating shortages of materials, the German 
leadership decided territorial expansion into Belgium and France was the better solution.
100
  
Müller, then, was arguing that the Germans based their decision to invade the West in part upon 
the need to solve the iron ore crisis they were facing.  This is important because concerns for raw 
materials have seldom been seen as a driving factor in the decision to invade France.  Müller’s 
theory is also important because it changes the way Sweden is viewed during the early stages of 
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World War II.  If this line of thinking is correct, then Sweden was not as critical to the German 
ability to wage war as initially thought if Germany was attempting to solve its iron ore crisis with 
the ore of Belgium and France.   
In regards to Müller’s theory that the invasion of France was undertaken to shore up the 
necessary iron ore that Sweden was unable to supply, many things must be stressed.  First, the 
idea of a German-dominated European continent had been floating around in Germany since the 
1920s.  It was always a part of Nazi strategy to run the continent, not a reaction to the situation in 
Sweden.  Second, Müller’s theory is not backed up by the most recent major study of the 
German economy during the Second World War, Tooze’s The Wages of Destruction.  Tooze 
argued that the conquest of France had developed many economic possibilities that had not 
seemed possible before 1939 but never postulates that the invasion was undertaken solely for 
economic gain.  In fact, Tooze points out that the invasion was more ideologically driven and 
was an attempt to break the alleged International Jewish conspiracy that Hitler saw in the 
alliance of Great Britain, France, and the United States and personified in ‘the chosen one’ 
President Franklin Roosevelt.
101
  However, as English-speaking authors have failed to 
adequately study Sweden during the Second World War, it cannot be assumed that Müller’s 
theory is wrong.  Müller based his argument on not only the realities of the German economy 
before the invasion of France but also on evidence from Hermann Gӧring, particularly a memo 
from a conversation between Gӧring and General Georg Thomas, head of the OKW armaments 
office, that showed Gӧring telling Thomas to prepare for the invasion with France as soon as 
possible because of the iron ore problem.  The Führer had decided, according to Gӧring, to make 
use of the stockpiles of raw materials in order to launch the invasion.  This plan was accepted by 
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Thomas and implementation began.
102
  The fact that this has not been covered more by historians 
proves the contention of this thesis that more attention should be paid by English-speaking 
historians to Scandinavia and its role in World War II.   
Swedish historian Gunnar Åselius has argued that the way Sweden is viewed in the 
Second World War needs to be changed.  Instead of focusing on Sweden during the 1930s and 
1940s, scholars should push the time frame back to the Franco-Prussian war.  According to 
Åselius, this longer time period allows Sweden to be seen as adapting to the new, developing 
world power, Germany.  After all, from 1870 world history can be viewed as Germany, Italy, 
and Japan trying to join, emulate, or usurp the old order and assert their power.  Åselius has also 
pointed out that the Swedish orientation towards Germany at this time was not just a political 
reaction to the growing power in that region, but it was also an economic reaction.  Sweden 
began industrializing after Germany had become the leading industrial nation in Europe.  
Sweden’s industry, then, was modeled on the German system and this created close economic tie 
between the two countries.  These economic ties, according to Åselius, led to closer cultural ties.  
German became the primary second language Swedish students learned and many Swedish 
teachers and professors studied abroad in Germany.  In fact, most of the Swedish decision 
makers, military, political, and business, from 1933 to 1945 had studied in Germany and had 
close cultural ties with Germany.
103
  Still, Nina Witoszek and Lars Trägårdh have shown that 
while Germany and Sweden might have had close economic and cultural ties and developed a 
shared ideology of a type of national socialism following the economic crisis of the 1930s, 
Hitler’s Germany and Per Albin Hansson’s Sweden developed into two very separate nations, 
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“True, even a cursory review of nineteenth-and early twentieth-century developments in 
Germany or Sweden reveals a number of affinities in the spheres of science, education, art, 
politics, and myth-making,” they argue.  “Yet, for all their mutual cross-fertilization, Sweden and 
Germany embraced two opposing self-images and followed two different trajectories of 
modernization.”104 
The most important thing about Åselius’s work is that it has changed the way scholars 
look at Sweden.  Most of the studies of Sweden during the Second World War focus on the 
morality of neutrality, which Stig Ekman has argued is the dominant trend in the Swedish 
historiography of the Second World War.
105
 Åselius’s work, though, has expanded the time 
frame in order to fully understand why Sweden was in Germany’s orbit.  This has shown that 
Sweden had a long history of cooperation with the Germans, and the two cultures were tied 
together.  This helps explain why Sweden could justify the continued shipments of iron ore to the 
Germans or grant them transit rights through Sweden, since they had a historical memory of a 
benevolent Germany with whom Sweden benefitted from mutual cooperation.  In many ways, 
Åselius’s work has helped to transcend the morality argument by showing that Sweden had 
enjoyed relations with Germany since 1870, which makes it obvious how they would react in 
1939.   
Another way of viewing Sweden’s policies during the Second World War is to 
understand not just Swedish history back to the 1870s, but to understand how Sweden 
experienced the First World War.  The Swedish Government wanted to differentiate its policy of 
neutrality between the First World War and the Second World War in order to avoid the mistakes 
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of the past.  These mistakes primarily included shortages of food and supplies as a result of strict 
neutrality and the questionable legality of the British blockade that had made life hard on the 
average Swede.  As a result, as Alf Johansson has pointed out, Sweden would use neutrality 
during the Second World War as a means of staying out of the war but would not strictly follow 
the policy of neutrality when dealing with the belligerents.  During this conflict, Sweden would 
pay close attention to the reality of the war and bend its policy of neutrality towards the stronger 
side.  “In other words, there was no willingness to fight for neutrality law as such in 1939.  In 
that sense, it can be said that the policy of concessions was inherent in the Swedish political 
attitude from the very outset.”106  Johansson would also argue that the humanitarian actions of 
Sweden in terms of the Holocaust cannot wipe away the shame of the concessions that Sweden 
awarded Nazi Germany during the war.
107
 
While much work still needs to be done on the scholarship of Swedish iron ore and its 
contribution to Germany’s war effort, at least it has now become a topic of discussion on the 
Second World War.  Much the same observation could be made about a second area in which 
Sweden played an outsized role during the war, the Holocaust.  Many people know the story of 
the Swede Raoul Wallenberg and how he saved tens of thousands of Jews from being deported 
from Hungary.  What many people do not know, academics included, is the story of how Sweden 
saved the Danish Jews.  This was a story from the Holocaust that was hardly ever mentioned 
until the turn of the century.  For instance, famed Holocaust historian Yehuda Bauer only 
devoted one and a half pages to the rescue of the Danish Jews in the revised 2001 version of the 
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classic A History of the Holocaust.
108
  Now, thanks to a new generation of historians, this story is 
finally being told in full.  While saving a few thousand Jews might not seem like a grand 
accomplishment, these were thousands of Jews more than most countries saved.  The future 
historiography on Sweden during World War II and the historiography of the Holocaust should 
continue the discussion started by some recent works. 
The first Swedish historian who investigated anti-Semitism was Hugo Valentin, whose 
book Antisemitism: Historically and Critically Examined laid the basis for Swedish ethnic and 
genocidal studies.  The book is not so much a work on anti-Semitism in general as it is a book 
written in 1936 on anti-Semitism, meaning it focuses almost solely on Germany and the rise of 
the Nazis.  In fact, Swedish anti-Semitism is not even mentioned in the book except to point out 
that Sweden’s Jewish population was only 0.1 percent of the total population.  Even this is only 
stated in order to show the reader a comparison of Swedish and Italian Jewish populations, which 
were equal.  In this way Valentin was showing how Italian fascism could differ from German 
fascism in terms of the Jewish question, since Italy did not have enough Jews to have to worry 
about a Jewish question.
109
   By extension, of course, Valentin’s larger unstated message was that 
since Sweden had a Jewish population proportionally similar to that of Italy, it had little cause to 
be concerned about a “Jewish problem,” despite the troubling rise of various Fascist and Nazi 
groups in Sweden. While Valentin’s work was definitely written with a bias towards Sweden, it 
can still be inferred that up to the book’s publication in 1937 anti-Semitism had not been a major 
factor in the everyday life of an average Swede.  While there had been some emerging anti-
Semitic groups in Sweden, Valentin wrote the book so that Swedish readers could understand the 
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foreign concept of anti-Semitism.  The only real mention made of Sweden or the other 
Scandinavian countries is in reference to Nazi racial science and the emphasis they placed upon 
the Nordic race as carrying the essential characteristics of the Germanic race.  Valentin 
chronicled the racial thought of Hans F. Günther only to come to the conclusion, “Nowhere 
outside the borders of Germany has the Nazi racial doctrine found acceptance, not even in the 
countries whose population, in contradistinction to the German, is Nordic with relatively little 
admixture, Scandinavia, Holland, England, where, according to Güther, “the genuine Teutons” 
are to be found.”110  Of course, in his bias Valentin forgot to mention that Swedish racial science 
pre-dated the Nazi racial science.  However, Valentin is correct in pointing out that a majority of 
Swedes, and in reality Scandinavians in general, enjoyed good relations with their Jewish fellow 
citizens.
111
 
Steven Koblik’s The Stones Cry Out was the first book written in English that addressed 
the Holocaust in Sweden.  While Koblik analyzed the positive Swedish actions of rescuing the 
Danish Jews and the actions of Raoul Wallenberg, he also argued that though newspapers and 
stories were circulating throughout Sweden during the Holocaust, the Swedish government 
continued to deny and suppress the actual events of the Holocaust form their population.  The 
Swedish government, according to Koblik, suppressed talk of this tragedy because of the damage 
such public discourse could have on its relationship with Germany.  In fact, Koblik argued that 
the evidence showed the Foreign Office of Sweden actively trying to suppress stories and 
mention of the Holocaust within Sweden.
112
  This puts the Swedish response to the Holocaust in 
perspective:  while Sweden might have saved many Jews from extermination from Denmark or 
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Wallenberg was saving tens of thousands in Hungary, the majority of Swedes were not actively 
participating in rescuing the Jews.  In fact, most of them did not even know what was happening 
in Germany.  As Koblik argued, “The government’s silence cannot in sum be explained because 
of its desires to be more helpful with regard to the Jews.  The real reason was fear of a negative 
German response if Sweden became a center for anti-German “propaganda.”  The government’s 
policy not only stopped the Swedish public form fully comprehending the plight of the Jews, it 
also contributed to a general international silence whose effects were probably helpful to the 
success of the Final Solution.”113  This would become the standard interpretation of the Swedish 
press in regards to the Holocaust; it was silent in order to maintain its ties with Germany.  Maria-
Pia Boëthius would also argue this point in her controversial book, Heder och Samvete. Sverige 
Under Andra Världskriget.  However, in Reporting the Holocaust in the British, Swedish and 
Finnish Press, 1945-50, Andtero Holmila pointed out that this was not an accurate interpretation 
of the Swedish press or the knowledge of the Swedish citizenry.  Holmila argued that the 
Swedish press kept the Swedish people well informed on what was happening to the Jews of 
Europe under Hitler and that the censorship protocols the Swedish government passed were 
hardly ever enforced.  In fact, the Holocaust was covered in more detail in Sweden than in Great 
Britain or even the United States.
114
 
Koblik came to the conclusion that Sweden contributed to the Holocaust by remaining 
silent throughout much of the war to the terror being perpetrated by Nazi Germany.  Although, 
Koblik recognized that after the rescue of the Danish Jews and the lack of a German response, 
Sweden became much more interested in helping the Jews, Koblik maintained that Sweden could 
have done more.  Koblik also correctly pointed out that the initiative for the Danish rescue or 
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Wallenberg’s activities in Hungary came from outside of the Swedish government, from the 
Danes and Americans.  Koblik argued that Swedish Prime Minister Hansson and Foreign 
Minister Günther both wanted to gradually swing towards the Allies in order to avoid an 
altercation with Germany.
115
  In this way they only took steps towards saving the Jews when the 
Allies put pressure on them, so that there would be an excuse if Germany was to bring it up.  
Koblik rightly argued that “If the Western Powers had placed a higher priority on Sweden 
helping the Jews, there is much evidence to suggest that Sweden would have acted more 
vigorously even in 1943…Should Sweden have depended upon their encouragement?  When it 
came to issues related to their Scandinavian brothers, there was little hesitancy to act.”116  This 
would become the primary argument amongst Swedish historians and authors, should Sweden 
have done more to save the Jews of Europe? 
The second, and the only other major Anglo-American work on Sweden during the 
Holocaust, was Paul A. Levine’s From Indifference to Activism: Swedish Diplomacy and the 
Holocaust, which came to some different conclusions than Koblik’s work.  Levine argued that 
once the Swedish government learned of the genocide being perpetrated by the Germans against 
the Jews, the Swedes became more active in rescuing the Jews.  The most striking difference 
between Koblik’s and Levine’s arguments, though, centered on the question of if more could 
have been done to save the Jews.  Levine argued, 
 But for historians the question of more remains, however compelling, the wrong one.  
On the contrary, what required asking is what was done, why, and by whom?  This study 
shows that when men working for Sweden’s government were confronted by certain 
choices, certain decisions were made.  Representatives of Sweden’s government, for a 
variety of reasons, decided it was worth their time and effort to try to save Jews during 
the war. That was their intent, and the available documentation leaves no question that 
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they worked energetically to achieve this goal.  Even a methodologically sound historian 
can appraise that as a good thing to have happened.
117
 
This refuted Koblik’s claim that the Swedes only helped the Jews at the insistence of the Allies.  
In fact, when explaining why Sweden chose to help the Jews Levine pointed out that Swedish 
government officials faced the same pressure from its population as the Allied countries faced, 
yet only the Swedes chose to act to save as many Jews as they could.
118
  This is a point of view 
that is missing from most of the academic works on Sweden during the Holocaust that are 
available in English, the uniqueness of Sweden actually acting in order to save the Jews.  As 
Levine argued, “When Swedish diplomats understood the choices which lay before them, they 
made the right choice.  During the war, Swedish moral indifference evolved into a committed, 
humanistic activism, and with this change lives were saved.”119  There are very few countries 
that the same could be written for in regards to the Holocaust. 
Emmy E. Werner has correctly pointed out in her 2002 book, A Conspiracy of Decency, 
that the decision undertaken by the Swedish Government to bring in Jewish refugees from 
Denmark signified a complete break from Sweden’s earlier policy of maintaining neutrality no 
matter what the cost.  For instance, on October 2, 1943, the Swedish Government offered asylum 
to all Danish Jews and on October 3, 1943, the Swedish Government ordered that the Swedish 
Navy was to keep all German ships out of Swedish waters.  Had the German Navy pressed the 
matter, the Swedes might very well have entered into the war against Hitler.  Along with the 
orders to keep out the German ships, the Swedish Government also ordered fuel to be made 
available to all Swedish fishermen so that they could aid in the rescue of the Danish Jews.  These 
orders came just a few weeks after the Swedes had ordered a complete halt to German military 
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transit through Sweden.  The Swedish actions were in part a response to what the Swedes had 
witnessed in the fall of 1942 in Norway, where the Nazis had implemented oppressive measures 
against the Norwegian Jews.
120
  Werner’s book is the first to critically examine the actual people 
involved in this story, both Jewish escapees and non-Jews who helped in the escape.  This 
approach makes sense, as Werner is a developmental psychologist and research professor at the 
University of California.  The book is an important contribution because it focuses on the people 
and what drove them to the decision to help the Danish Jews. 
John Gilmour’s 2010 book, Sweden, The Swastika, and Stalin, examined Sweden during 
the Second World War.  In the book, Gilmour wrote about Sweden during the Holocaust and 
made the point that in February 1943, only eight months before the Swedish decision to save the 
Danish Jews, the Swedes had rejected but then accepted a plan that would have sent 20,000 
Jewish children to live in Sweden on the condition the Americans and British paid for their food.  
Gilmour argued that this was not because the Swedes did not care about the fate of the Jews, 
rather, the Swedes wanted to make the plan palatable to the Germans.  The Swedes also were 
undergoing talks at this time about taking in undernourished Norwegian children and repatriating 
them into Swedish society.
121
  It becomes obvious that the Swedes were dismissing the plan 
because they were realistic and did not want to take on too many refugees or open themselves up 
to an invasion.  The Nazis were still seen as the likely victor in the war at this point and it would 
have been disastrous for the Swedes to adopt this policy.  The Swedes took action once it became 
possible for them to do so, October 1943.   
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Baltic and Polish refugees were also a major issue for the Swedish government during the 
Second World War.  While there had been a steady stream of refugees from Norway, Finland, 
and Germany throughout the war, towards the end of the war there was a surge in refugees from 
the Baltic states and Poland.  Included in these refugees were liberated concentration camp 
survivors.  There has been little written in English about these refugees, Lars Olsson’s On the 
Threshold of the People’s Home of Sweden being the only major work in English to focus on 
these refugees.  Olsson’s book, though, primarily deals with the assimilation of these refugees 
into Swedish society and how the Swedes viewed the refugees stay in Sweden as temporary.
122
  
While Olsson’s book is biased towards a labor point of view, it still raises a critical question, 
why did the Swedes take these refugees on?  Olsson answered that they were brought in for two 
reasons, to improve Sweden’s image with the Allies who were emerging victorious and because 
Sweden needed labor for its capitalist society.
123
  While the argument that Sweden granted these 
refugees temporary asylum in order to reap economic benefits from them could be argued 
against, the reality is that the Swedes did take these refugees on in order to repair their tarnished 
reputation amongst the Allied states.   
An example of how the rescue of the Danish Jews has not been fairly represented in the 
historiography of the Holocaust is Alex Kershaw’s 2010 book, The Envoy: The Epic Rescue of 
the Last Jews of Europe.  In the book, Kershaw examines the Holocaust and how it ended.  
Kershaw goes into great detail about Raoul Wallenberg, which is deserved, but fails to 
acknowledge the rescue of the Danish Jews.  Kershaw noted, “Although most well-informed 
people have heard of Wallenberg today, many, including Jews, know less about him than about 
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Oscar Schindler, who saved far fewer people and in any case profited from their forced labor.”124  
This is not meant to suggest that Wallenberg is not deserving of the credit he has been given.  If 
anything there needs to be more research done into his life and the effects he had on the 
Holocaust.  What is apparent, though, is that many academics have become bogged down when 
looking into Sweden and focus only on Wallenberg and fail to fairly assess the rescue of the 
Danish Jews.  The rescue was not important just because it saved thousands of lives, it was 
important because it was Sweden’s break from neutrality.  In the span of a month the Swedes had 
gone from accommodating Hitler to ordering its Navy to keep German ships out of its water. 
One other aspect of the Holocaust that Sweden played a role in that has not received 
enough attention amongst English-speaking historians is the role of racial science.  Jonas 
Hansson, a Swedish historian, has pointed out how race biology and science took a dominant 
role in the early twentieth century.  Swedish legislative action attempted to halt immigration and 
introduced sterilization into Swedish society.  Hansson discussed the various Swedish historians 
who have tackled this problem but pointed out that much research needs to be done to adequately 
assess how close the Swedish and German racial sciences were to one another.
125
  Another 
historian, Piero Cola, has analyzed how Swedish racial science and the overall concept of the 
Swedish community were directly responsible for the halt to immigration.  Cola pointed out that 
when the Swedish State Administration for Health allowed ten Jewish students expelled from 
schools in Germany to come to Sweden and take up residency, it led to the largest xenophobic 
backlash in Sweden’s history.  Student societies and universities all came out in favor of banning 
and blocking this type of behavior from the government because Swedish society viewed Jewish 
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immigration as a threat to the racial community of Sweden.  Cola argued that this backlash and 
these feelings, while lacking the anti-Semitism of Nazi Germany, represented how the majority 
of the population felt.  Simply put, Sweden had adopted the idea of protecting its racial purity 
despite the fact that Swedish racial science started out as hardly anti-Semitic, but by the 1930s, 
there had been an adoption of anti-Semitic ideas that resulted in Sweden denying immigration to 
German Jews.
126
  This, of course, is in stark contrast to Valentin’s assertion that anti-Semitism 
was a foreign concept to the Swedes. This contradiction is further proof that there is more work 
to be done on Sweden in regards to the Holocaust as, ironically, Swedish eugenics policies 
would remain in effect, and Sweden continued to sterilize “unfit” women, until 1975. 
The Swedes were allowed to get away with their involvement in hindering the Holocaust 
because the iron ore trade was so vital to the German war economy that Hitler had to turn a blind 
eye towards these events.  It is not a coincidence that the Swedes began to save Jews after the 
Germans lost at Stalingrad and were unable to regain the initiative in the east, the Swedes 
understood not just that the Jews were being killed, as Levine has pointed out, the Swedes also 
understood that they could get away with helping the Jews.  A comparison between how the 
Nazis treated Sweden and Hungary in regards to the Holocaust shows the importance of Swedish 
iron ore to the Nazis.  In March 1944, the Nazis invaded Hungary in part because the Hungarian 
government would neither implement, nor deport, its Jewish citizens for the Final Solution.
127
  
All the Hungarians had to offer the Germans, the last oil fields Germany could attain as well as a 
buffer between the Soviet Union and Germany, could be taken relatively easy by force.  Sweden 
was able to escape the demands of the Final Solution because the Nazis could not, under any 
circumstances, lose the iron ore that Sweden provided.  This is how the two topics of this 
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chapter, iron ore and the Holocaust, overlap.  The importance of Sweden’s iron ore allowed 
Sweden the opportunity to act with autonomy in regards to the Holocaust. 
In conclusion, the Swedes followed policies that were designed to protect its neutrality 
and save its population from the horrors they saw around them.  The Nazis had invaded their 
Western neighbor, Norway, and the Soviets were waging war with their Eastern neighbor, 
Finland.  It is understandable that Sweden would want to remain outside of this conflict.  Anglo-
American Historians and academics have long admitted the importance of Swedish iron ore to 
the German war effort, but as this chapter has shown, they have also largely failed to analyze the 
problem.  Anglo-American historians have been the worst offenders, as only a handful of books 
and articles have actually addressed Sweden’s dilemma and the tangible effect Swedish iron ore 
had on the German economy.  Recently, there have been some attempts by English-speaking 
historians at answering these questions in depth, Gilmour’s and Werner’s recent works being the 
prime examples, but the dearth of material is still overwhelming.  Further, Sweden’s role in the 
Holocaust continues to be overshadowed by the actions of an individual Swede, Wallenberg, and 
not the actions of the state.  Sweden played a much larger role in the Second World War then 
they have been given credit for, both in terms of supplying the Germans and saving thousands of 
Jews. 
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CHAPTER 4 
NORWAY: INVADED AND OVERLOOKED 
The Norwegian campaign of 1940 was the first occasion on which all three elements of 
modern war—sea, land and air—were fully involved.  This frequently quoted truism 
makes its history basic reading for the study of the functions and organization of defence; 
perhaps the most urgent problem which faces the strategist of today.  For this reason 
alone, the campaign has a more lasting importance than that of a small unsuccessful 
episode of a war fought under conditions unlikely to be repeated.
128
 
 J.L. Moulton was quite correct in his analysis of the German invasion of Norway, as it 
was the first time in military history that sea, land, and air were fully involved and fully 
coordinated.  This campaign was instructive to both the German Military and the Allied Military; 
yet, the importance that Moulton attached to this campaign has been lost to modern scholars.  
Rarely has an academic work focused on this campaign, especially amongst English-speaking 
academics.  Once again, the overwhelming majority of scholars have focused on the Eastern 
Front or Anglo-American actions that proved more successful.  While these topics are important 
to the scholarship of the war, they alone do not represent the whole story of World War II.  
Though the Norwegian campaign has garnered more attention than the Finnish or Swedish 
stories from World War II amongst English-speaking historians and academics, it is still severely 
under covered.  While Moulton might have been right in his analysis of the invasion, his analysis 
on its lasting importance has proven false.   
 Halvdan Koht was the Foreign Minister for the Norwegian Government leading up to the 
German invasion of Norway.  After the invasion Koht immediately wrote a book on the invasion 
of Norway, 1941’s Norway: Neutral and Invaded, which sought to make the struggle Norway 
was facing more known to the rest of the world.  In the book, Koht argued that Norway had the 
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unique position of having known nearly continuous peace since 1720; with the exception of the 
Napoleonic Wars and a brief three-week war in 1788.  Koht summarized this phenomenon: 
“Thus the peace traditions of the Norwegian people were extraordinarily deep-rooted.  They 
thought of peace as the natural condition of nations, and they had no longing for military 
honours.  People who imagine that warfare is needed to keep a nation brave and proud and 
prevent it from degeneration, may take the Norwegian example as a refutation of such 
theories.”129  This was the state of Norway leading up to German invasion, a nation that not only 
had known peace for over two centuries but had come to believe that peace was the natural order 
of things for the nation. 
 Indeed, following the First World War there developed in Norway a discomfort with the 
League of Nations and the idea of collective security.  Norway became disillusioned with the 
League of Nations as an entity that could actually pacify a conflict and chose to focus on national 
or regional (Scandinavian) defense.  This was in large part due to the other demands on the 
national economy that were primarily a consequence of the growing social welfare state.  Many 
Norwegians found it easy to compromise on defense spending because they believed neutrality 
would work again and they saw the money could be used better elsewhere.
130
  Koht pointed out 
that it had been the League’s failure in dealing with the Italian invasion of Ethiopia that had 
moved the Norwegians to join their Scandinavian brethren, Spain, the Netherlands, and 
Switzerland in telling the League on July 1, 1936, that they would no longer be moved to follow 
collective security and would begin acting on an individual basis because of the League’s 
inconsistencies and failures.
131
  As Hitler began moving pieces on the European checkerboard, 
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the Norwegians continued to pursue neutrality and the autonomy of choice towards military 
action.  As the rest of Europe began silently preparing for war, Norway was attempting to escape 
that conflict by cutting its ties to collective security and Europe. 
 Henrik O. Lunde has pointed out that in September 1939, as the war began, neither the 
Allies nor Germany planned for the conflict to entangle Norway or the rest of Scandinavia.  In 
fact, Germany wanted Norway to remain neutral and met Norway’s September 2, 1939, 
declaration of neutrality with immediate satisfaction.
132
  Earl Ziemke noted that during the first 
week of the war, German Ambassador Ulrich von Hassell was sent to all of the Scandinavian 
capitals in order to give reassurances that Germany would respect their independence while 
warning these governments not to restrict their trade with Germany.
133
  Von Hassell’s trip is 
symbolic of Norway’s involvement with the Second World War because the issue of trade would 
dominate Norway’s wartime experience.  It was vital to the Germans, as this work’s second 
chapter showed, for Germany to maintain its iron ore trade with Sweden and Norway was a 
major shipping route for that iron ore during the winter months when iron ore could not be 
shipped through Sweden.  While Lunde might have been quite correct in arguing that in 
September 1939 neither belligerent was interested in Scandinavia, it would not take either 
belligerent long to become interested in Norway and the rest of Scandinavia. 
 As early as September 19, 1939, only sixteen days after the Allies declared war on 
Germany, the British began discussing what to do about Germany receiving Swedish iron ore 
shipped from the Norwegian port of Narvik during the winter months.  Winston Churchill noted 
in his six-volume history of the war that on September 19
th
 he had brought up to the British War 
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Cabinet the idea of mining the Norwegian waters before the winter iron ore trade began.  This 
would have forced any ship that was trading iron ore to the Germans to have to leave Norwegian 
territorial waters and enter the open sea where the Royal Navy could confiscate the iron ore.  
Churchill noted that the Cabinet was open to the idea but no decision was reached on that day.  
In fact, on September 29, 1939, Churchill would again bring up the issue of Narvik, only to have 
the British War Cabinet ignore it once again.  As Churchill wrote, “The Foreign Office 
arguments about neutrality were weighty, and I could not prevail.  I continued, as will be seen, to 
press my point by every means and on all occasions.  It was not, however, until April, 1940, that 
the decision that I asked for in September, 1939, was taken.  By that time it was too late.”134  The 
British, particularly Churchill, were interested in cutting off the German access to Swedish iron 
ore, if not permanently then at least for the winter months.  In the early stage of the war, though, 
the British could not even agree if mining the Norwegian waters should even be attempted.  The 
end result of the British deliberations was a growing suspicion amongst German military leaders 
about the role the British wanted to play in Scandinavia. 
 To the Allied powers, the Winter War provided a unique opportunity to help out the 
democratic Finland while also occupying the iron ore fields of Sweden and shutting down trade 
through Narvik.  Churchill noted, “If Narvik was to become a kind of Allied base to supply the 
Finns, it would certainly be easy to prevent the German ships loading ore at the port and sailing 
safely down the Leads to Germany.”135  To the British, then, the importance of both Norway and 
Finland was tied directly to the ability to halt the German acquisition of Swedish iron ore.  The 
Allied plan to mine the territorial waters of Norway was not being discussed as a way to protect 
the sovereignty and neutrality of Norway; it was being discussed because it presented the 
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opportunity to help the British war effort.  The same can be said for Finland, although there was 
much outcry against the Soviet invasion of the small, democratic state.  The Allies looked to 
Scandinavia not as a neutral area, but rather as an area that could be used to the advantage of the 
Allied cause by cutting off German access to Swedish iron ore through the occupation of Narvik 
and the Swedish fields themselves.  British historian Sir Llewellyn Woodward argued that the 
Winter War provided the Allies the opportunity to enter Scandinavia under the pretext of helping 
the Finns, which had been authorized by the League of Nations, thus making the action not a 
violation of Norwegian or Swedish neutrality.  In fact, it was not until the Winter War that 
landing troops in Scandinavia had even been contemplated.
136
 
 The British Foreign Office had come to agree with Churchill’s December 16, 1939, 
argument that the British could not fight the war while allowing the Germans to break 
international law while the British followed international law, though how the Germans were 
breaking international law was never made clear.  The Foreign Office decided that if the British 
actions were not inhumane, the British could begin considering a policy in regards to the Narvik 
ore traffic.  The British, though, did not see much point in halting the Narvik traffic because the 
infringement of Norwegian territorial waters would not involve any major achievement for the 
British, since the Germans would just regain the iron ore once the Baltic was free of ice.  To 
achieve any real success, the Baltic traffic would have to be cut as well, which meant seizing the 
Swedish iron ore mines themselves.
137
  The opportunity to leave troops in Sweden while sending 
help to Finland during the Winter War provided the Allied Cause the incentive to begin planning 
for the occupation of the Swedish iron ore mines. 
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 From the German perspective, Scandinavia was quickly becoming an area that would not 
be able to maintain its neutrality.  In his memoirs, Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel wrote,  
Discussions had been taking place since October 1939 with the Navy on the vital 
importance of Norway as a naval and air base for the further conduct of the war, should 
the British manage to get a foot-hold there: they would be in a position to dominate the 
Bay of Heligoland and the exit channels for our fleet and submarine forces as well as 
confronting our naval ports and the passage from the Baltic out into the Atlantic with a 
serious threat from their Air Force.
138
   
 
German planning, then, pre-dated the start of the Winter War between Finland and the Soviet 
Union.  In fact, the German Navy had been arguing the importance of the Norwegian coast as a 
naval base as far back as Vice-Admiral Wolfgang Wegener’s 1926 treatise The Naval Strategy of 
the World War.  Wegener’s thesis was that during the First World War the German navy should 
not have been content to wage a defensive war from the protection of the North Sea, but rather, 
should have expanded to the Skagerrak.  This would have allowed the Germans to control the 
shipping routes of Norway, which would have benefited Germany and harmed the British.  
Controlling a naval line further from the coast of Germany would have helped the German war 
effort because controlling shipping routes is the real strength of a navy.
139
  Wegener’s ideas 
would form the crux of German naval strategy during the 1930s, especially influencing Admiral 
Raeder, who would become the next champion of the Norwegian strategy.  
 Admiral Raeder’s biographer has pointed out that during October 1939 Raeder himself 
was taking a prominent role in the discussion of German action in Norway.  On October 10, 
1939, Raeder suggested to Hitler that bases along the Norwegian coast would be a value to the 
U-boat war and more importantly in protecting German shipments of Swedish iron ore.  His 
biographer, Keith Bird, argued that Admiral Raeder was primarily motivated by the desire to 
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ensure that the German Navy’s share of economic resources did not diminish during the war.140  
Either way, though, the real importance of Raeder’s conversation with Hitler is not whether it 
was done in order to protect the German Navy or in order to attain these valuable bases; rather, 
the importance is the German Navy was discussing occupying Norway with Hitler almost two 
months before Stalin launched the Winter War against Finland.  So while it has been argued by 
both Ziemke and Lunde that neither the Germans nor the Allies had plans for Scandinavia when 
the war began, it did not take either side very long to come up with plans for the involvement of 
Scandinavia.  Churchill had begun planning for the elimination of Swedish iron ore by 
September 19, 1939, and Erich Raeder had begun planning for the occupation of Norway by 
October 10, 1939; the war had only begun on September 1, 1939. 
 The German planning for an invasion of Norway is not mentioned in Army Chief of Staff 
Halder’s wartime diary until December 14, 1939, nearly two months after Raeder’s conversation 
with Hitler.  More important, though, December 14 was only a few weeks after the Winter War 
had begun.  Halder’s diary, written in shorthand, only mentions that the issue of a preventative 
war was discussed, without providing much detail except that the operation would be a combined 
operation between the Navy and the Army and that it would be undertaken simultaneously with 
an invasion of Denmark.
141
  Churchill argued that this signified the German decision to invade 
Norway, claiming that “Quisling and his assistant, Hagelin, came to Berlin on December 14, and 
were taken by Raeder to Hitler, to discuss a political stroke in Norway.  Quisling arrived with a 
detailed plan.  Hitler, careful of secrecy, affected reluctance to increase his commitments, and 
said he would prefer a neutral Scandinavia.  Nevertheless, according to Raeder, it was on this 
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very day that he gave the order to the Supreme Command to prepare for a Norwegian 
operation.”142  Henrik Lunde has correctly pointed out, though, that this is entirely misleading.  
Lunde argued, “Hitler only directed OKW to investigate how to take control of the country.  
Churchill’s statement makes it appear that the Germans decided to invade Norway before they 
actually did.”143 
 Vidkun Quisling, who Hitler met with on December 14, 1939, was a Norwegian 
politician of little notoriety at the time.  Quisling had served as Defense Minister during Peder 
Kolstad’s and Jens Hundseid’s governments from 1931 to 1933 after which time Quisling began 
forming his own National Socialist Party modeled on the Nazi example.  Quisling would spend 
the rest of the 1930s leading the far-right in Norway, albeit to limited success.  When the war 
broke out, Quisling decided to take advantage of the situation and sought Nazi Germany’s help 
in taking control in Norway, hence the December 14 meeting.  As Quisling’s biographer, Ralph 
Hewins, pointed out, “During the last quarter of a century a network of Norwegian, British, 
German and Russian vested interests has blackened Quisling’s name with almost every 
imaginable crime from murder and theft to high treason, until his character and career have 
become completely distorted in history and in the popular imagination at home and abroad.”144  
Hewins made that argument in 1966; the forty-five plus years that have passed since then have 
only further muddled the debate about what role Quisling played and how he should be viewed.   
 Hewins eventually arrived at the conclusion that Quisling was not the treasonous usurper 
that most historians have made him out to be.  In fact, Hewins believed that had Quisling not 
fallen in league with Rosenberg, one of the chief Nazi racial theorists, Quisling would have 
escaped the war without much damage to his character.  The Quisling that Hewins presented was 
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a Quisling who wanted to protect Norway from becoming a Protectorate, the fate of Poland, 
Bohemia, and Holland, and the only way this could be prevented would be if Quisling led the 
country.
145
 This view of Quisling, a flawed man trying to save his country, definitely stands out 
amongst the various works that have been written about Quisling, but that does not make it 
correct.  Another of Quisling’s biographers, Paul Hayes, argued,  
Being this kind of person, an intelligent dreamer, devoid of political qualities such as 
perception and the ability to compromise, how did Quisling become famous as a man of 
action?  The fact is that the world made its judgement on him in April 1940, and has not 
changed that judgement since.  Major Quisling, like Judge Lynch and Captain Boycott, 
has been immortalised by giving his name to a word in the English language.  Yet how 
strange is the decree of history!  Whatever Quisling may have been, he was certainly not 
the most obvious candidate for that dubious honour.  He was muddled rather than 
thoroughly corrupted.  He loved Norway but he disagreed with the majority of his fellow 
countrymen on how best to protect his native land from dangers threatening it in the 
1930s…How ironical that it is Quisling who is remembered above all as the archetypal 
traitor!
146
  
 
Hayes reiterated the idea that Quisling was not a traitor, instead he was just a man who has been 
unfairly judged by history.  These two revisionist biographies were attempting to change the way 
that Quisling was viewed amongst historians by insinuating that he was not a traitor but he 
simply backed the wrong horse in his attempt to protect Norway from complete occupation by 
the Nazis.   
 The principal reason that Quisling is important for this thesis is the fact that his very 
name has created an atmosphere around the Norwegian campaign that suggests Norway was lost 
only because of his treachery.  This has allowed the Norwegians, British, and French an easy 
explanation for two difficult questions, first why Norway was lost to the Germans and second 
why Germany was even interested in Norway.  As the rest of this thesis will show, Norway was 
not invaded, nor did it fall, because of the actions of Vidkun Quisling.  Norway was invaded 
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because of Allied actions, particularly the plans for the occupation of the Swedish iron ore fields 
and the port of Narvik, as well as the Altmark incident.  These were the real reasons that 
Germany invaded Norway, and their fault lies in the Allied hands.  Norway did not fall because 
Quisling gave intelligence to the Nazis or how he maneuvered himself into power; rather, it fell 
because the Allies pulled out of Norway in order to halt the German advance through France.  
This inconvenient truth has led English speaking authors, particularly the British, to overstate the 
importance of Vidkun Quisling.  Hewins and Hayes, then, were actually right in their analysis of 
Quisling. 
 Lunde pointed out some of the major reasons why Quisling had no direct impact upon the 
German planning of the invasion of Norway.  Lunde first noted that, “There is no evidence to 
suggest that the information received from Quisling had any major effect on German 
preparations, or that Quisling had any knowledge about German plans.  Claims by some British 
authors…that Quisling provided the Germans with detailed information…are not supported by 
the subsequent developments or by information in German sources.”147  How, then, was Quisling 
a traitor who caused the invasion of Norway?  The reality is that there is no documentation to 
support the thesis that Quisling helped plan the invasion.  Lunde further shattered this long-
standing notion by pointing out “The fact that German intelligence was wrong on several issues 
well known to Quisling and his followers suggests that they provided little or no information of 
military value.”148  One of the examples that Lunde cites to show this was General von 
Falkenhorst’s directive for the attack on Narvik.  The directive for the attack called on the 139th 
Mountain Regiment to capture Narvik, the army depot at Elvegårdsmoen, and the fortifications 
that were believed to exist on both sides of Ofortfjord near Ramsund, but in reality did not.  
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Some historians have argued that Quisling gave the Germans the information on these shore 
batteries.  However, as Lunde pointed out, Quisling would have known that there were not any 
shore batteries here and would not have informed the Germans that there were.
149
 
 The major reason Hitler and the Nazis became involved in Norway was the iron ore 
traffic.  As Churchill pointed out, the Winter War brought an Allied strategy to both help the 
Finns and cut off a vital resource the Germans needed for their war economy, iron ore.  As Geirr 
Haarr has noted, the Germans were not interested in promoting Quisling to power; for instance, 
Foreign Minister Ribbentrop was disturbed that Hitler had even met with Quisling and the 
German minister in Oslo Curt Bräuer made it immediately known to top level Nazis that 
Quisling held no significant leverage in Norway.  ‘Studie Nord,’ the initial plan for the invasion 
of Norway, was strictly hypothetical when it was commissioned in the second week of January 
1940.  ‘Studie Nord’ came to the conclusion that a neutral Norway without a major British 
influence was to the German advantage but also recommended that pre-emptive plans for an 
invasion of Norway should be drawn up.  It was not until January 27, 1940, that Hitler instructed 
the OKW to develop these plans under the special Sonderstab Weserübung.
150
  Halder even 
wrote on January 1, 1940, that Quisling had no followers and “It is in our interest to keep 
Norway neutral.  In case England threatened Norway’s neutrality, our policy will change.”151  
Halder’s contemporary observation hit at the key point, that it was not Quisling, but rather 
British actions, which drove German decision-making in regards to Norway.  Even after the 
meetings between Hitler and Quisling, Hitler continued to hold to the idea that a neutral Norway 
would be the most beneficial to Germany.  Once it became obvious during the Winter War that 
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the Allies were developing plans to send troops into Scandinavia the Germans began drawing up 
plans, not as a result of Quisling’s visit.  In fact, once Hitler had approved of the plans for the 
invasion of Norway on February 29, 1940, Hitler stressed to Rosenberg that there was to be no 
attempt to attain Quisling’s support in any way.152 
 Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz also argued that the planning for action in Norway was not a 
result of Quisling’s visit.  In his memoirs, Doenitz wrote, “There were indications that the enemy 
also was planning military operations against Norway.  It was these indications which finally led 
to the decision to forestall [the enemy] by means of a counter-stroke…It was in the light of this 
situation and within the framework of the general plan that we at U-boat Command were to take 
action.  All preparations were to be completed by March 10…”153  This passage was in reference 
to the March 5, 1940, decision to invade Norway and Denmark but is relevant to this discussion 
because it shows how the Allied actions were driving German strategy.  Doenitz did not write 
that operations had been ordered because Hitler believed the Norwegian and Danes would rally 
around Quisling and the Nazi cause, he wrote that the operations were being planned as a 
response to what German intelligence knew about French and British operational plans.  The 
Allied plans were for the occupation of the Swedish iron ore fields and the port of Narvik, this is 
what pushed the Germans into action. 
 What, though, pushed the Germans from the findings of ‘Studie Nord,’ that a neutral 
Norway was best for Germany to the March 5 decision to invade?  The answer to that question is 
the Altmark incident.  The Altmark was a German tanker that had been acting as a supply vessel 
to the pocket-battleship Admiral Graf Spee.  The Graf Spee had sunk at least nine British 
merchant ships, though the men aboard the ships had been taken prisoner before the British ships 
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had been sunk.  Of these prisoners, 299 would end up on the Altmark.  The British eventually 
drove the Graf Spee into Montevideo where the Brtish prisoners were released and rescued.  The 
British, then, knew that the Altmark contained prisoners when it was stopped in Norwegian 
territorial waters near Trondheim on February 14, 1940, by a Norwegian torpedo boat.  The 
Norwegians let the boat continue until it was stopped a second and a third time by Norwegian 
torpedo boats.  Eventually, the Royal Navy’s 4th Destroyer Flotilla caught wind of the Altmark’s 
position and moved in.  After finding the ship the British surrounded it but the Altmark was able 
to evade the British ships, thanks to some help from the Norwegian Navy’s attempts to preserve 
neutrality.
154
  On the evening of February 16, 1940, the Altmark was forced into Joessing Fjord 
by the Cossack, a British destroyer, and the prisoners were freed.  Controversy arose 
immediately because the British actions were in clear violation of the laws of neutrality, since 
they had initiated combat in territorial waters without any regard for Norway’s neutrality.  Edwin 
Borchard, an American legal scholar, had even argued in April 1940 that the Germans had not 
violated Norway’s neutrality by sailing through the waters, but the British had violated 
Norwegian neutrality by forcing the issue.
155
  The historical significance of this event, though, 
has often been neglected by English-speaking historians.  Many still try to regard this incident as 
secondary to Quisling’s meetings with Hitler as the major driving force in the decision to invade 
Norway. 
As one British historian has argued, “On the whole, it appears that Hitler himself 
regarded the occupation of Norway primarily as a preventative measure and that, although 
instructions to make a plan date from Hitler’s first meeting with Quisling on 14th December, the 
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effective decision to implement it resulted from the Altmark episode of 16
th
 February, which 
showed that…Britain was ready to infringe Norwegian neutrality.”156  Derry, then, was one of 
the few British historians to correctly point out why the Germans chose to invade Norway.  
Derry’s interpretation, of course, suffers from the same mistake as Churchill’s overall 
interpretation of the Norwegian Campaign, that the December 14
th
 meeting with Quisling had 
made the invasion of Norway inevitable.  Derry, at least, understood the significance of the 
Altmark Incident for the actual invasion of Norway.  For instance, Churchill’s opinion of the 
significance of the Altmark appears to be the prestige the rescue of the British prisoners gave him 
and the Navy.
157
 Churchill actually argued, “Hitler’s decision to invade Norway had, as we have 
seen, been taken on December 14, and the staff work was proceeding under Keitel.  The incident 
of the Altmark no doubt gave a spur to action.”158  In this way Churchill was continuing the trend 
he had established previously in The Gathering Storm of shifting the blame for the decision to 
invade Norway onto Quisling and Hitler.  Churchill reiterates that the decision to invade had 
been made following the December 14 meeting between Quisling and Hitler and then glosses 
over the Altmark Incident as if the only significance of that episode was that he had rescued a 
few hundred British soldiers held on board that ship.  Churchill fails to mention that it was the 
British decision to overlook Norwegian neutrality by boarding a German boat in Norwegian 
territory that made the Germans decide to launch the invasion. 
 William Shirer, the American journalist who lived through the Nazi years in Germany, 
argued that January 27, 1940, marked the end of Hitler’s hesitations about an invasion of 
Norway.  On this day, Hitler had Keitel issue a directive that shifted all work on ‘Studie Nord’ to 
be continued under the direct supervision of Hitler.  Hitler also ordered Keitel to take charge of 
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the operation that would now be known as Weserübung.  However, Keitel also argued that the 
Altmark Incident was “For Hitler…the last straw.  It convinced him that the Norwegians would 
not seriously oppose a British display of force in their own territorial waters.”159  Once again, 
there is an attempt to downplay the significance of the Altmark, as Shirer attempts to argue that 
January 27 was the real day that the decision had been made that an invasion was going to occur 
and the Altmark was just the event the was the last straw.  Shirer, though, does not base the 
argument that January 27
th
 was a remarkable day upon any tangible proof.  He offered no 
explanation why that decision, to shift to Weserübung represented a concrete shift in Hitler’s 
mind that it was no longer in Germany’s interest for Norway to remain neutral.  As Haarr argued, 
Weserübung was just a preventative strategy, and it was the Altmark Incident that turned these 
plans from hypothetical to imminent. 
 The German invasion of Norway and Denmark depended upon surprise, as the German 
navy could not hope to achieve success against the superior Allied naval forces any other way.  
Seven divisions were set aside for the invasion, six for Norway and one for Denmark.  Three 
divisions would attack and four would be used in the follow-up to the invasion.  Around eight 
hundred operational aircraft and between two and three hundred transport planes were to be used 
in the seaborne landings as well.  The German plan was to surprise both the Allies and 
Norwegians with their landing in order to prepare for defense against the Allied naval forces.  It 
was believed that the Germans could defend their position against the Allies by capturing 
Norwegian airports and using the Luftwaffe as a tool against the Allied navy.  To German 
military leaders the greatest danger lay in bringing home the ships after dropping off the 
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troops.
160
  General von Falkenhorst was a surprise choice to lead the invasion due to his 
aristocratic origins.  Indeed, on February 20, 1940, von Falkenhorst had been summoned to a 
meeting with Hitler to go over von Falkenhorst’s experience in landing German troops in Finland 
during Finland’s Civil War in 1918, not to name him commander of Weserübung.  As François 
Kersaudy has argued, though, “perhaps because he got carried away by his diatribe, and more 
likely because he ‘sensed’ that he had found the right man, Hitler entrusted von Falkenhorst on 
the spot with the command of Operation Weserübung.”161 
 In 1943 the Royal Norwegian Government Information Office published a short book 
about the German invasion of Norway.  According to the document, within twelve hours the 
Germans had taken Oslo, Kristiansand, Arendal, Egersund, Stavanger, Bergen, Trondheim, 
Narvik, and all of the airfields.  In the next few days all of the railway connections with Sweden 
were taken.
162
  The British response to the German invasion was quite astounding.  The British 
Royal Navy battered the German Navy off of the coast of Narvik on April 13 so badly it led 
historian Tom Shachtman to quip “…after the battle nothing German moved in Narvik 
waters.”163  The success of the battle was not the most surprising, what stands out about April 13, 
1940, is that the British did not follow up this victory with an attack on the German troops 
stationed along the coast.  General Eduard Dietl, who was in command of the troops in Narvik, 
believed the British could have finished his forces off that afternoon and could not believe when 
the British ships left the Narvik waters.  Indeed, Hitler himself believed the campaign was over 
and drafted up an order that would have forced General Deitl to move his troops from Narvik 
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and fight their way down to Trondheim, thus forsaking Narvik, the main objective point of the 
Norwegian invasion.  If not for Hitler’s staff purposefully holding the order up so that Hitler’s 
mind could be changed, the order would have been given.
164
  April 13, 1940, could have been a 
transformative day in the history of Europe, it could have become the day Norway was saved and 
Germany lost her iron ore supplies and the ability to wage war.  However, the thirteenth of April 
ended like so many other days in Norway would end, with the British refusing to snatch victory 
from Germany. 
As for the British strategy for landing operation in Norway, Churchill argued in The 
Gathering Storm: 
Trondheim, if it were within our strength, was of course the key to any considerable 
operations in Central Norway.  To gain it meant a safe harbor with quays and docks upon 
which an army of fifty thousand men or more could be built up and based.  Near-by was 
an airfield from which several fighter squadrons could work.  The possession of 
Trondheim would open direct railway contact with Sweden, and greatly improve the 
chances of Swedish intervention or the degree of mutual aid possible if Sweden herself 
attacked.  From Trondheim alone the northward advance of the German invasion from 
Oslo could be securely barred…Narvik, far away to the north, could be stormed or 
reduced at leisure and would all the while be protected.
165
  
 
 Involving Sweden into the conflict would greatly improve the strategic aim of the British, since 
it would have given them a second chance at cutting off iron ore from the Germans.  Indeed, 
cutting off the German ability to advance north would allow the British to continue holding them 
at bay off the coast of Narvik; which would cut off iron ore traffic from that area.  On April 14, 
1940, the British landed 350 seamen and marines from the cruisers Glasgow and Sheffield onto 
the shores of Namsos a city to the north of Trondheim.  These landings were undertaken in order 
to forestall a German landing at Namsos, but the news from the landed troops was far from 
encouraging.  Poor weather and facilities dominated the reporting from this landing, with the 
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main idea stressed being that a large battalion would have difficulty advancing anywhere from 
Namsos.  The British had also devised for a landing in Åndalsnes, a city to the south of 
Trondheim.  While many in the British Cabinet showed hesitations about landing troops in the 
Trondheim Fjord, Churchill continued to stress that an attack on Trondheim would be the best 
strategy.  Churchill considered the Namsos and Åndalsnes landings merely a diversion to 
confuse the Germans, while the main thrust would be against Trondheim itself. Indeed, April 22 
or 23 was seen as the probable timetable for the invasion of Trondheim, but at noon on April 20, 
the British Chiefs of Staff cancelled the attack that Churchill had planned in favor of reinforcing 
the British troops in Namsos and Åndalsnes and enveloping Trondheim in a pincer movement.  
Trondheim, then, remained the strategic aim of the attack, but the British Chiefs of Staff saw no 
reason to risk the Home Fleet against the German Luftwaffe, which was achieving some success 
against British ships docked near the Trondheim Fjord.
166
   
 General Sir Edmund Ironside wrote on April 20, 1940, of the decision to avoid a direct 
landing at Trondheim in favor of a pincer movement, “The new situation brought about by the 
giving up of the main attack on Trondheim means a great deal more weight upon the two little 
ports of Namsos and Andalsnes.  Weight which we never expected would come there.  Now we 
must mount all the paraphernalia of a Base port to see that it [the force] doesn’t fall down in 
front…I believe as a basis of thought that we ought to be able to take the place inside a 
month.”167  This statement can be taken as both optimistic, that Ironside believed that the pincer 
movement would eventually be successful against the Germans in Trodheim, and pessimistic, 
since he also believed the forces in Namsos and Åndalsnes were not adequately equipped.  Either 
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way, Ironside’s musings left out one crucial element of the British plan for Trondheim, no one 
had told the men in Namsos or Åndalsnes that the direct naval landings in Trondheim had been 
cancelled.  Further complicating matters was the German advance north towards Trondheim 
from Oslo, which was increasingly becoming more and more successful.
168
  The situation, then, 
was that a last minute change of plans had been made that the landed British troops were not 
even made aware of, while the Germans steadily increased their position in the southern-center 
sections of Norway.  It would appear that General Ironside was being too optimistic in his 
prediction of taking Trondheim within a month. 
 Lunde argued that the abandonment of a direct operation against Trondheim doomed the 
Allied effort in central and southern Norway to failure because the rationale of having troops 
move in from Namsos and Åndalsnes was to draw German troops out of Trondheim, thereby 
making it easier for an Allied landing to take the city.  Further, the snowy conditions made it 
unlikely that a pincer movement would succeed because it was virtually impossible to cover the 
long trek to Trondheim.
169
  Indeed, Derry noted that Lieutenant-General H.R.S. Massy was 
appointed to command all Allied troops in Norway except those in Narvik, but the new General 
and his headquarters never left London due to the speed that things turned badly for the Allies in 
central and southern Norway.  By the end of April, the decision had been made to withdraw 
troops from central Norway due to the reality that the Germans had fortified their position in 
Trondheim.
170
   
 As May 12 passed into May 13, the British, under General Mackesy, landed their first 
troops into the Narvik area.  General Auchinleck took control of the troops in northern Norway 
with instructions to cut off the iron ore supplies and hold Narvik for the Norwegian King and his 
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government.  The assault on Narvik would not begin until May 27, 1940, though, well after 
Hitler’s invasion of the west had begun.  In fact, according to Churchill the decision to 
concentrate all Allied strength in France had been made on May 24, 1940.  The British had taken 
Narvik by May 28, 1940, along with four hundred German prisoners.  Churchill lamented this 
fact in his memoirs, arguing, “We now had to relinquish all that we had won after such painful 
exertions.”171  It is ironic that the very same moment the British were struggling to get as many 
men off the shores of Dunkirk as they could; they had finally achieved their goals in Norway, the 
occupation of Narvik.   
 A military withdrawal from Narvik by the British, in all reality, made sense.  France was 
likely to fall and it did not take too long to figure out that Hitler would next turn his attention to 
crushing the British.  From a strategic standpoint, then, withdrawing troops in order to have them 
available for the defense of Great Britain was more than justifiable.  What was unjustifiable, 
though, is how the British handled the decision to evacuate Narvik.  The British, according to 
Derry, worked out the evacuation in total secret from the Norwegians.  “Our naval resources 
being stretched to the uttermost, the paramount need was to exploit the capture of Narvik in such 
a way that the Germans might have no inkling of our intentions to withdraw until the main 
convoys were well on their way home.”172  The Norwegians, then, genuinely believed that 
Narvik was to be held as a last vestige of free Norway, and they had no idea that the Allies were 
using the victory in order to pull out of the country.  Derry justified this behavior by noting that 
there had been some leaked information, including information that had postponed the final 
assault on Norway, and the fear of what the Norwegians would think led to the decision to keep 
the Norwegians in the dark about the decision.  It was not until June 1, 1940, only a week before 
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the withdrawal that the Norwegians were informed of the Allied decision.
173
  After the Allied 
withdrawal, Narvik was retaken by the Germans and an armistice was signed between Norway 
and Germany. 
Churchill, of course, painted the picture so that the failure of the Norwegian campaign 
had been due to the realities of the German advance west.  However, Lunde has pointed out that 
part of the problem in Norway was the way in which the Allies acted towards their Norwegian 
partners.  The British commanders, Mackesy and Auchinleck, never felt it important to visit and 
discuss plans with the Norwegian military commanders, General Fleischer and General Ruge.  
Further, as Lunde argued, by not letting the Norwegian commanders know of the planned 
withdrawals from central and southern Norway, the Norwegians lost many men who were taken 
prisoner, because they had no idea they were being left to fend for themselves.  The Norwegian 
advocacy for the strike on Trondheim and the use of the British navy, which was just sitting in 
the bay of Narvik, went unheeded.  Lunde noted, “The campaign in Norway is a textbook 
example of what to avoid when multi-national forces are involved in joint operations…The 
Allies were involved in the beginnings of a giant struggle that had worldwide implications while 
the Norwegian leadership was more concerned about what happened in Norway.”174  The result 
of the failure of the Norwegian campaign, then, can be argued to have been the Allied dismissal 
of the Norwegians and their ideas.  While this was not the sole reason for the Allied defeat, the 
German advance into France was indeed unstoppable, an assault on Trondheim would have at 
least been the correct strategy.   
How should the campaign in Norway be viewed?  Both the German and British initiatives 
into the country had started out so well for both countries, yet the Germans won out in the end 
                                                          
173
 Derry, 218-219. 
174
 Lunde, Hitler’s Pre-emptive War, 477-481. 
85 
 
despite being defeated in the pivotal battle.  Churchill chose to look at the bright side of the 
failures of Norway, ending his analysis by arguing that the Norwegian campaign had effectively 
eliminated the threat of the German navy in the coming Battle of Britain.
175
  This was indeed an 
important accomplishment, but does it vindicate the British for the ineptitude of the campaign as 
a whole?  Did the Norwegian people fight and die for their freedom so that the British could have 
an easier time in defending London?  The real significance of the Norwegian campaign is the 
fact that the Germans now had control of Scandinavia and all of the Swedish iron ore and 
Finnish nickel it needed to build new ships, airplanes, rifles, and ammunition.  Anglo-American 
historians have always looked to the Scandinavian theater as of secondary importance, but the 
reality is that this area could have been denied to the German war machine.  The British had 
captured Narvik, which had been the goal of the entire Allied plans for Scandinavia since 
Churchill had first argued for involvement in Scandinavia on September 19, 1939.  To achieve 
that goal and just a little over a week later withdraw from that port was nearly unfathomable. 
Further, one question that remains to be answered is, how could defending Narvik have 
harmed the British defense during the Battle of Britain?  The Battle of Britain was an aerial 
battle that required very little in terms of ground troops, so the troops stationed in Narvik would 
not have been a huge loss to the British defense.  Yet, no English-speaking historian has asked 
why Narvik had to be evacuated to protect Great Britain.  Further, continued operations in 
Narvik would have tied up several Luftwaffe squadrons that were actually used during the blitz, 
which would at least have mitigated the damage from leaving troops in Narvik.  It appears that 
most English-speaking historians are eager to push the blame for the failures in Norway off onto 
Quisling and the fall of France without ever questioning if operations in Norway needed to have 
even failed.  Moulton’s quote from the beginning of this chapter argued that the German invasion 
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was the first to fully use planes, ships, and ground troops in an invasion, yet by the end of May 
1940 the Allies had taken Narvik and destroyed the German navy.  How truly effective were the 
Germans in Norway, then?  The war would have turned out very differently if the Germans had 
lost Scandinavia, as the Allies would have been able to keep the Nazis on the defensive in 
Sweden and Operation ‘Barbarossa’ would likely have been postponed.  For these reasons, more 
investigation into the Norwegian theater is more than worthy of Anglo-American historians 
attention. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
The Second World War is one of the most discussed events in human history amongst 
Anglo-American historians, yet as this thesis has shown there are still gaps in the historical 
literature, at least by Anglo-American historians.  Our understanding of the war can only 
advance as our knowledge and understanding of the interaction of the various fronts advance.  It 
is not just enough to know that Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in 1941, since the context of that 
invasion must be understood in order for historians to fully comprehend why Hitler made that 
decision.  Nor is it enough to know that Norway was invaded in April 1940; again, understanding 
needs to be reached of why Hitler felt it was vital to use troops in this area so close to the start of 
the Western offensive.  Anglo-American historians cannot continue to gloss over Scandinavia if 
the war is to ever be fully understood amongst English-speaking scholars.  This region deserves 
more attention than the few pages that scholars have been willing to devote towards it, because 
as this thesis has shown when Anglo-American authors or non-English speaking historians have 
written extensively about Scandinavia during the Second World War, a plethora of information 
that is usually omitted becomes apparent. 
 In the first chapter of this thesis, the importance of Finland was analyzed, specifically 
how Finland contributed to the German decision to invade the Soviet Union.  During the Winter 
War, the Allies became obsessed with using this conflict as an excuse to send Allied troops into 
Scandinavia to achieve the goal of cutting off the German supply of Swedish iron ore.  Troops 
would disembark in Narvik and then occupy the northern parts of Sweden where the iron ore was 
mined; the remaining troops would enter Finland in order to help protect Finnish national 
sovereignty.  Churchill had championed this strategy because it was believed that cutting off 
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access to Swedish iron ore would result in an inability of the Germans to manufacture the war 
material they needed to achieve victory.  Hitler understood what the Allies were planning and the 
disastrous effect it would have on German means of production, which is why after the Winter 
War he became ardent in his opinion that the Soviet Union must not bring more war into Finland.  
Indeed, the desired course of action for Nazi Germany was for Scandinavia to be in a state of 
peace, as this would rob the Allies of an excuse to invade Scandinavia and cut off the German 
supply of Swedish iron ore. 
 The Winter War also resulted in a German reassessment of Soviet strength and 
capabilities.  As Chapter One showed, German military leaders, especially Hitler, were not at all 
impressed with the Soviet Army during the Winter War.  The Soviet Union had one of the largest 
armies in the world in 1939, yet they could not quickly defeat the small nation of Finland in 
combat.  The lesson that Hitler learned from the Winter War was not that a large army will 
struggle under poor leadership and hostile terrain; rather, Hitler learned that the Soviet Union 
posed no threat to Germany or its desire to achieve Lebensraum in the east.  The war in the East 
had initially been viewed as a war that would have to wait, but the Winter War changed this 
perception amongst German military leaders.  Hitler drew from the Winter War the perception 
that he did not have to wait to conquer France and England to take up arms against the Soviets; 
instead he could do it whenever he felt it was necessary.  Some Anglo-American historians have 
furthered this argument, albeit it is usually only covered in detail in works that specialize on the 
Winter War.  As the first chapter showed, even the standard work on the lead up to the German 
invasion of the Soviet Union, Gorodetsky’s Grand Delusion, does not even discuss Finland. 
 The importance of Finland is not only that it showed the Germans the weaknesses of the 
Soviet Union or that the Allies wanted to turn Scandinavia into a war zone.  One of the key 
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reasons why Finland is more important to the story of World War II than Anglo-American 
historians have been willing to grant is how the Winter War and its aftermath showed that 
German and Soviet interests in Scandinavia were not compatible.  As Krosby showed, the issue 
of who would be in charge of the Petsamo nickel mines dominated the political relationship 
between Germany, the Soviet Union, and Finland.  This was an issue that the Nazis could not 
back down from, as they desperately needed Finnish nickel to continue its war machine.  Yet, the 
Soviet Union felt that it needed to be in control of the nickel mines, regardless of what the 
Germans thought.  This would lead Hitler in August 1940 to make the decision that if the Soviets 
pushed the issue in Petsamo, the Germans would occupy Petsamo and risk an early war with the 
Soviets.  As Chapter One showed, the Soviets were not interested in acquiring nickel, the Soviets 
wanted to control the nickel output and incorporate Petsamo into the Soviet Union.  This would 
have allowed the Soviets to control the vital resource and have leverage in their dealings with 
Hitler and Germany.  This action, though, was a power grab by the Soviets that Hitler would not 
allow, even if it meant war with the Soviets nearly a year earlier than the Nazis were planning.  
This would climax in November 1940 when Hitler and Molotov met to discuss the future 
relations between the Soviet Union and Germany.  Hitler began screaming at Molotov that no 
war should come to Finland, which Molotov had insinuated the Soviets wanted.  The November 
meeting between the two showed Hitler that war with the Soviets was going to come sooner or 
later, and Finland was the main topic of discussion at that meeting.  In December 1940, Directive 
No. 21 was issued, which began the planning for Operation ‘Barbarossa,’ the November meeting 
was a major part in leading to this decision. 
 In the second chapter the issue of how Sweden contributed to the Nazi war machine by 
supplying Nazi Germany with the vital stocks of iron ore it needed to continue manufacturing its 
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war materials was investigated.  The Nazi economy was analyzed and it was established that 
Hitler did not think that the invasion of Poland would result in a larger war with Great Britain 
and France.  When this occurred, though, it eliminated imports of French and Benelux iron ore 
into the Reich.  Germany, then, had to consolidate its remaining source of iron ore, Sweden.  It 
was not only that Sweden was the last country still contributing significant supplies of iron ore to 
Germany, but rather it was the fact that Swedish iron ore was the highest quality of iron ore on 
earth.  Indeed, by 1939 Sweden accounted for half of the iron ore imported into Germany, which 
combined with is high quality made it of the utmost importance for the Reich.  As Chapter Two 
argued, the year 1940 alone represents how important Swedish iron ore was to Germany because 
in that year Germany lost 40 percent of its iron ore imports.  Without Swedish iron ore coming 
into Germany, the Reich would not have survived into 1941.  This was why Churchill and the 
Allies put so much effort into planning how to cut off the German supply of Swedish iron ore 
during the Winter War and after, it truly would have crushed the German war economy.  Indeed, 
as Martin Fritz argued, the high quality of Swedish iron ore helped to ease the bottleneck on 
German shipping because it was of such a high quality, less had to be shipped. 
 In Chapter Two it was also argued that Anglo-American historians have typically missed 
the significance of Swedish action during the Holocaust.  For instance, rarely have English-
speaking historians discussed the rescue of the Danish Jews, which was undertaken by the 
Swedes.  Steven Koblik and Paul Levine deserve much credit for writing about these 
undertakings and bringing them to light for Anglo-American audiences.  The story of how the 
Swedes rescued the Danish Jews is not so much important for the triumph it represented in 
standing up to the Reich, as much as how it showed the importance of Swedish iron ore to the 
Nazis.  It was not as if the Nazis had no clue where the Danish Jews ended up, they fully 
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understood that the Swedes had rescued them.  The Nazis, though, understood that they could not 
take action against Sweden for rescuing these Jews because of what it might mean towards the 
iron ore trade.  The example of Hungary was used in Chapter Two to compare how the fate of 
these two nations and their refusal to cooperate with the Final Solution ended in two completely 
different fates based upon what they could offer to the Reich.  Sweden, because of its iron ore, 
and location, was able to escape occupation or any real reprisals from the Nazis because of the 
fact that an invasion would lead to the iron ore mines being destroyed before the Nazis could 
occupy them.  The Hungarians, though, only had oil and a vital buffer zone to offer the Nazis.  
Oil fields could be easily repaired in comparison to iron ore mines and it mattered little if the 
Hungarians or the Nazis were running the country in terms of it being a buffer zone.  This 
example is the best evidence for the importance of Swedish iron ore to the Nazi war machine, 
they had to turn a blind eye towards the Swedish interruption of the Final Solution in order to 
continue the war. 
 In Chapter Three the Nazi invasion of Norway was examined in order to determine how 
accurate the Anglo-American interpretation of that event was.  It was established in this chapter 
that at the outbreak of war the Nazis wanted Norway to remain neutral, a feeling that the Nazis 
held until the Altmark Incident proved Norwegian neutrality was not enforceable against the 
British.  While Anglo-American authors have continued to pass the blame for the invasion upon 
the alleged instigating actions of Vidkun Quisling, Chapter Three showed that up until February 
1940 there was no serious planning for any German action in Norway.  Certianly, there were 
operational plans drawn up and investigated, but those were strictly hypothetical.  It was not until 
the Germans were convinced that the Allies would not respect the neutrality of Norway that 
these plans shifted from the hypothetical to reality.  The catalyst for this was not Quisling’s visit, 
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as Churchill and so many other Anglo-American historians have argued; rather, it was the British 
boarding of the Altmark.  This was not the sole event that spurred Hitler to immediate action, but 
it was the event that created the desire for action.  By not understating this event, Anglo-
American historians have continued to misconstrue the invasion of Norway. 
 It was also argued in Chapter Three that the Allies could have defeated the Germans in 
Norway in April 1940 if they would only have seized the initiative.  It was shown that the British 
had completely obliterated the German naval forces in the harbor of Narvik on April 13, 1940, 
leaving no German ships still afloat.  Yet, the British did not take the initiative and land its troops 
in Narvik to fight the few hundred Germans stationed there.  German General Dietl, who was in 
charge of the German troops stationed in Narvik, could not believe his eyes when the British 
chose to head home instead of land and fight the Germans.  Hitler himself was so sure that 
Narvik was lost after the British wiped out the German ships stationed at Narvik that he ordered 
General Dietl to evacuate Narvik and retreat to meet the other German forces stationed in 
Trondheim.  If not for Hitler’s staff interfering in delivering the order, the Germans would have 
given up Narvik.  Remarkably, though, this failure is rarely mentioned in the Anglo-American 
histories of the Second World War.  For historians this episode should be more widely 
understood because it was a true chance to turn the tide of the war in April 1940.  If the British 
had taken Narvik, which had been their goal since September 19, 1939, then they could have 
effectively cut the Germans off from the Swedish iron ore they believed the Germans to so 
desperately need.  Would this not have been worth fighting a battle over? 
 Chapter Three also analyzed another failure of the Allies in Norway during April 1940, 
the decision to avoid a direct landing in Trondheim.  The British had successfully landed troops 
in Namsos and Åndalsnes, two Norwegian ports that surrounded the major Norwegian port of 
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Trondheim.  The British wanted to run the Germans out of Trondheim, so it was planned to use 
the troops in Namsos and Åndalsnes to distract the Germans while the British landed troops into 
Trondheim itself.  The idea was for a direct assault upon the city.  When the time came for the 
landings, though, the British changed plans at the last minute in the hopes that a pincer 
movement coordinated between the troops in Namsos and Åndalsnes could achieve victory 
against the Germans.  Even this attack, though, was reconsidered and the Allies decided to 
withdraw all troops from central Norway in late-April.  Once again, here was a chance for the 
Allies to achieve victory against the Nazis squandered.  The Final Allied mistake came in May 
1940 after the Allies finally took the city of Narvik.  The Allies quickly decided to evacuate from 
this city, though, because of the German victories in France.  The entire goal of having Allied 
troops in Norway had finally been achieved, yet the Allies decided to forsake this victory.  As 
Chapter Three pointed out, though, the saddest part of all of this was that the Allies did not even 
let the Norwegians know that the decision had been made to withdraw until well after the 
decision had been made.  The significance of Norway to the Second World War, as the Third 
Chapter pointed out, was that because of Allied mistakes the Germans now had secured the 
Swedish iron ore and Finnish nickel that they needed to continue the war.  The Allies would 
never again be in a position to break this supply until 1945, when the war was ending.   
 It is a shame that Anglo-American historians have not looked into this region more in the 
study of the Second World War.  A lot of the answers to questions of why certain things 
happened in World War II come from events that transpired in Scandinavia.  While there are 
seldom definitive answers to any questions in regards to the Second World War, the overall 
importance of Scandinavia must be better understood amongst Anglo-American historians.  
Every work by historians who have investigated Scandinavia in further detail, H. Peter Krosby, 
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John Gilmour, Martin Fritz, or Henrik Lunde for example, has yielded evidence of the 
importance of this region that has seldom, if ever, been discussed amongst Anglo-American 
historians.  The events in Scandinavia that this thesis has investigated are open to interpretation.  
What is not open for interpretation, though, is that these events deserve more than the few 
paragraphs or few pages that are generally assigned to them by Anglo-American historians. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
95 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Andenæs, Johs, O. Riste, and M. Skodvin, eds. Norway and the Second World War. Oslo: Johan Grundt 
Tanum Forlag, 1966. 
Anderson, Albin T. “Origins of the Winter War: A Study of Russo-Finnish Diplomacy,” World Politics 6, 
no. 2 (January 1954): 169-189. 
Bauer, Yehuda Bauer. A History of the Holocaust. Rev. Ed. Danbury, Connecticut: Franklin Watts, 2001. 
Baynes, Norman, ed. The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, April 1922-August 1939 Vol. II. New York: Howard 
Fertig, 1969. 
Beck, Peter J. “The Winter War in the International Context: Britain and the League of Nations’ Role in 
the Russo-Finnish Dispute, 1939-1940” Journal of Baltic Studies, 12, no. 1 (1981): 58-73. 
Bird, Keith. Erich Raeder: Admiral of the Third Reich. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2006. 
Bock, General Feldmarschall Fedor von.  The War Diary, 1939-1945. Edited by Klaus Gerbet. Translated by David 
Johnston. Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History, 1996. 
Borchard, Edwin “Was Norway Delinquent in the Case of the Altmark” The American Journal of 
International Law 34, no. 2 (April, 1940): 289-294. 
Brown, David, ed. Naval Operations of the Campaign in Norway: April-June 1940. London & Portland, 
Oregon: Frank Cass, 2000. 
Churchill, Winston. The Gathering Storm. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1948. 
Degras, Jane, ed. Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy vol. 3: 1933-1939. London: Oxford University 
Press, 1953. 
Derry, T.K. The Campaign in Norway. London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1952. 
Doenitz, Karl. Memoirs: Ten Years and Twenty Days. Translated by R.H. Stevens. Annapolis, Maryland: 
Naval Institue Press, 1990. 
Doerr, Paul. “’Frigid but Unprovocative’: British Policy Towards the USSR from the Nazi-Soviet Pact to 
the Winter War. 1939” The Journal of Contemporary History 36 no. 3 (July, 2001): 423-439. 
Doherty, Martin A. “The Attack on the Altmark: A Case Study in Wartime Propaganda” Journal of 
Contemporary History 38, no. 2 (April, 2003): 187-200. 
Ebenstein, William. The Nazi State. New York: Farrar & Rinehart Incorporated, 1943. 
Edwards, Robert. The Winter War: Russia’s Invasion of Finland, 1939-1940. New York: Pegasus Books, 
2008. 
Ekman, Stig, Klas Åmark and John Toler, eds. Sweden’s Relations with Nazism, Nazi Germany and the 
Holocaust: A Survey of Research. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 2003. 
96 
 
Ekman, Stig and Nils Edling, eds. War Experience, Self Image and National Identity: The Second World 
War as Myth and History. Translated by Thomas Munch-Petersen and The Swedish Trade 
Council. Sӧdertälje: The Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation, 1997. 
Engle, Eloise and Lauri Paananen. The Winter War: The Russo-Finnish Conflict, 1939-40. New York: 
Scribner, 1972. 
Erfurth, Waldemar. The Last Finnish War. Washington D.C.: University Publications of America,Inc., 
1979. 
Fritz, Martin. German Steel and Swedish Iron Ore, 1939-1945. Translated by Eva and Allan Green. 
Kungsbacka: Elanders Boktryckeri Aktiebolag, 1974. 
Fritz, Stephen G. Ostkrieg: Hitler’s War of Extermination in the East. Lexington: University of Kentucky 
Press, 2011. 
Gilmour, John. Sweden, the Swastika, and Stalin: The Swedish Experience in the Second World War. 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010. 
Goebbels, Joseph. The Goebbels Diaries, 1939-1941 Translated and Edited by Fred Taylor. New York: 
G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1983. 
Gorodetsky, Gabriel. Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1999. 
Guderian, General Heinz. Panzer Leader. Translated by Constantine Fitzgibbon. New York: E.P. Dutton 
& Co., Inc., 1952. 
Haarr, Geirr H. The German Invasion of Norway. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2009. 
Hägglӧf, M. Gunnar. “A Test of Neutrality: Sweden in the Second World War” International Affairs 36, 
no. 2 (April, 1960): 153-167. 
Halder, General Franz. The Halder War Diary: 1939-1942. Edited by Charles Burdick and Hans-Adolf 
Jacobsen. Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1988. 
------.The Halder Diaries: The Private War Journals of Colonel General Franz Halder. Edited by Arnold 
Lissance. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1976. 
Hastings, Max. Inferno: The World at War, 1939-1945. New York: Alfred K. Knopf, 2011. 
Hayes, Paul M. Hayes. Quisling: The Career and Political Ideas of Vidkun Quisling, 1887-1945. Newton 
Abbot: David & Charles, 1971. 
Hewins, Ralph. Quisling: Prophet Without Honour. New York: The John Day Company, 1966. 
Hitler, Adolf. My New Order. Edited by Raoul de Roussy de Sales. New York: Octagon Books, 1973. 
97 
 
Holmila, Antero. Reporting the Holocaust in the British, Swedish and Finnish Press, 1945-50. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. 
Ironside, Sir Edmund. Time Unguarded: The Ironside Diaries, 1937-1940. Edited by Roderick Macleod 
and Denis Kelly. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1974. 
Jakobson, Max. The Diplomacy of the Winter War: An Account of the Russo-Finnish War, 1939-1940. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961. 
Keegan, John. The Second World War. New York: Penguin Books, 1990. 
Keitel, Field-Marshal Wilhelm. The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Keitel. Edited byWalter Gorlitz. Translated by David 
Irving. New York: Stein and Day, 1966. 
Kershaw, Alex. The Envoy: The Epic Rescue of the Last Jews of Europe in the Desperate Closing Months 
of World War II. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Da Capo Press, 2010. 
Kersaudy, François. Norway 1940. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990. 
Kinnunen, Tiina and Ville Kivimäki, eds. Finland in World War II: History, Memory, Interpretations. 
London & Boston: Brill, 2012. 
Kirby, David. A Concise History of Finland. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
Khrushchev, Nikita. Khrushchev Remembers. Translated and edited by Strobe Talbott. Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1970. 
Klein, Burton H. Germany’s Economic Preparations for War. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1959. 
Koblik, Steven. The Stones Cry Out: Sweden’s Response to the Persecution of the Jews. New York: 
Holocaust Library, 1988. 
Koht, Halvdan. Norway: Neutral and Invaded. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1941. 
Krosby, H. Peter. Finland, Germany, and the Soviet Union: The Petsamo Dispute. Madison: The 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1968. 
Lehmkuhl, Herman K. Hitler Attacks Norway. London: The Royal Norwegian Government Information 
Office, 1943. 
Leitz, Christian Leitz. Sympathy For the Devil: Neutral Europe and Nazi Germany in World War II. New 
York: New York University Press, 2001. 
Levine, Paul A. From Indifference to Activism: Swedish Diplomacy and the Holocaust; 1938-1944. 
Uppsala: Department of History, Uppsala University, 1996. 
Liddell Hart, B.H. History of the Second World War. Old Saybrook, Connecticut: Konecky & Konecky, 
1970. 
98 
 
Lukacs, John . “Finland Vindicated” Foreign Affairs, 71, no. 4 (Fall 1992): 50-63. 
Lunde, Henrik O. Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940. Philadelphia & Newbury: 
Casemate, 2010. 
Mann, Chris and Christer Jӧrgensen. Hitler’s Arctic War: The German Campaigns in Norway, Finland, and the 
USSR 1940-1945. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2002. 
Mannerheim, Carl Gustaf Emil. The Memoirs of Marshal Mannerheim. Translated by Count Eric 
Lewenhaupt. New York: E.P. Dutton & Company, Inc., 1954. 
Mazour, Anatole. Finland: Between East and West. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1956. 
Militärgeschichtlisches Forschungsamt, ed. Germany and the Second World War. 10 vols. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1991. 
Moulton, J.L. The Norwegian Campaign of 1940: A Study of Warfare in Three Dimensions. London: Eyre & 
Spottiswoode, 1966. 
Nevakivi, Jukka. The Appeal that was Never Made: The Allies, Scandinavia and The Finnish Winter War, 
1939-1940. Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1976. 
------.“The Great Powers and Finland’s Winter War” Revue Internationale D’Histoire Militaire 62 
(1985): 55-73. 
Olsson, Lars. On the Threshold of the People’s Home of Sweden: a Labor Perspective of Baltic refugees 
and relieved Polish concentration camp prisoners in Sweden at the end of World War II. New 
York: Center for Migration Studies, 1997. 
Overy, Richard. Interrogations: The Nazi Elite in Allied Hands, 1945. New York: Penguin Books, 2001. 
------. “Hitler’s War and the German Economy: A reinterpretation,” The Economic History Review 35, no. 
2 (May 1982): 272-291. 
Procopé Hjalmar Johan Frederik, ed., Finland Reveals Her Secret Documents on Soviet Policy, March 
1940-June 1941. The Attitude of the USSR to Finland after the Peace of Moscow. New York: W. 
Funk Inc., 1941. 
Rhys-Jones, Graham. Churchill and the Norway Campaign 1940. Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen & 
Sword Military, 2008. 
Roberts, Andrew. The Storm of War: A New History of the Second World War. New York: Harper Collins 
Publishers, 2011. 
Schwartz, Andrew J. America and the Russo-Finnish War. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 
1960. 
Shachtman, Tom. The Phoney War: 1939-1940. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1982. 
99 
 
Shirer, William Shirer. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany. New York: 
Fawcett Crest, 1962. 
Sontag, Raymond James and James Stuart Beddie, eds. Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939-1941: Documents 
from the Archives of the German Foreign Office. Washington D.C.: Department of State, 1948. 
Speer, Albert. Inside the Third Reich: Memoirs. Translated by Richard and Clara Winston. New York: 
Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 1970. 
Spring, D.W. “The Soviet Decision for War Against Finland, 30 November, 1939” Soviet Studies 38, no. 
2 (April, 1986): 207-226. 
Tooze, Adam. The Wages of Destruction. New York: Penguin Books, 2006. 
Trotter, William R. Frozen Hell: The Russo-Finnish Winter War of 1939-40. Chapel Hill: Algonquin 
Books of Chapel Hill, 2000. 
Ulam, Adam. Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-73. 2nd ed. New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1974. 
Valentin, Hugo. Antisemitism: Historically and Critically Examined. Translated by A.G. Chater. Freeport, 
New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1971. 
Vehviläinen, Olli. Finland in the Second World War: Between Germany and Russia. Translated by Gerard 
McAlester. New York: Palgrave, 2002. 
Vilhavainen, Timo. “The Soviet Decision for War Against Finland, 30 November, 1939: A Comment” 
Soviet Studies 39, no. 2 (April, 1987): 314-317. 
Wegener, Wolfgang. The Naval Strategy of the World War. Translated by Holger H. Herwig. Annapolis, 
Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1989. 
Weinberg, Gerhard. Germany and the Soviet Union, 1939-1941. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1954. 
------. The Foreign Policy of Hitler’s Germany: Starting World War II, 1937-1939. Chicago and London: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1980. 
Werner, Emmy E. A Conspiracy of Decency: The Rescue of the Danish Jews During World War II. 
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2002. 
Wistrich, Robert S. Hitler and the Holocaust. New York: A Modern Library Chronicles Book, 2003. 
Witoszek, Nina and Lars Trägårdh, eds. Culture and Crisis: The Case of Germany and Sweden. New 
York and Oxford: Berghahm Books, 2002. 
Woodward, Sir Llewellyn.  British Foreign Policy in the Second World War Volume I. London: Her 
Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1970. 
Ziemke, Earl F. The German Northern Operations, 1940-1945. Washington D.C.: Headquarters, 
Department of the Army, 1959. 
100 
 
VITA 
JASON PHILLIPS 
 
Personal Data:   Date of Birth: January 21, 1989 
    Place of Birth: Fort Scott, Kansas 
    Marital Status: Married 
 
Education:   Public Schools, Fort Scott, Kansas 
    B.A. History, Sterling College, Sterling, Kansas 2011 
    M.A. History, East Tennessee State University, Johnson City,   
    Tennessee 2013                                    
 
Professional Experience: Tuition Scholarship, East Tennessee State University, College of    
    Arts and Sciences, 2011-2012 
    Graduate Assistant, East Tennessee State University, College of  
    Arts and Sciences, 2012-2013 
 
 
